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Introduction 
Section 1338(a) of title 28 of the United States Code gives the federal 
district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising 
under the copyright laws,l but when does a claim "arise under" the copy­
right laws? Although a wide variety of cases have presented this ques­
tion, one factual scenario has produced the most inconsistent results. 
That case may typically be described as follows: Plaintiff is an author 
who created a work and transferred some or all of her copyright interests 
therein to another, the defendant, subject to certain conditions; the trans­
feree used the work, but breached some of those conditions. The author 
sues in federal court, claiming copyright infringement and breach of con­
tract. The transferee moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.2 
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. 1974, Con­
necticut College; J.D. 1978, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank my colleagues, John D. 
Egnal and Arthur D. Wolf, for their assistance during the preparation of this Article; their 
willingness to read drafts and discuss issues of federal jurisdiction with me is much appreci­
ated. I also thank the members of the Western New England College School of Law faculty 
who participated in a faculty forum regarding this Article; many oftheir suggestions have been 
incorporated herein. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Howard 1. Kalod­
ner, Dean of Western New England College School of Law, for supporting this project with a 
summer research grant, to Professor J. Russell VerSteeg, New England School of Law, to my 
research assistant, John T. Wolohan, and to Nancy Hachigian. 
Most importantly, I want to thank my husband, Harvey Shrage, who is a constant and 
continuing source of inspiration for everything I do. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, 
copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in 
patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases."). 
2. E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990) (unau­
thorized use of copyrighted work developed under contract); Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 
991 (9th Cir. 1983) (registering of book copyright in violation of contract); Lukasewych v. 
Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (failure to pay under contract 
for use of copyrighted photographs); Bear Creek Prods. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 
[337] 
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There are a number of possible variations on this theme. For exam­
ple, sometimes the author sues in state court and the transferee moves to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the case arises 
under the copyright laws,3 or the transferee removes the case to federal 
court on that basis and the author then moves to remand the case to state 
court.4 In other cases the author, after assigning the entire copyright to 
the other, attacks the assignment's validity and reasserts her rights to use 
the work. Either party might bring suit in this situation. The transferee 
would likely defend the contract's validity and charge that the author's 
use of the work infringed the copyright, breached the contract, or both.5 
Meanwhile, the author might seek to have the assignment contract de­
clared void, claim that the transferee infringed the copyright by using the 
work without a valid assignment, or both.6 Still other cases focus on 
conflicting assignments under which various parties claim ownership of 
the copyright, each alleging that the others are breaching a contract, in­
fringing the copyright, or both.7 Whatever the particular factual context, 
these cases all raise a similar legal issue: Does a claim arise under the 
copyright laws when a critical allegation is that a party's use of a copy­
1986) (failure to pay under contract for purchase of copyrighted materials); Berger v. Simon & 
Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (refusal to recognize author'S right to withdraw 
work under publication agreement); Joseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. United States Dev. 
Corp., 601 F. SUpp. 673 (N.D. III. 1985) (unauthorized copying of work in violation of con­
tract); Wolfe v. United Artists Corp., 583 F. SUpp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (failure to provide 
author with accountings, royalties, and copyright notices); Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, 
Inc., 442 F. SUpp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (failure to pay royalties and give authorship notices 
under agreement assigning copyright). 
3. E.g., Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (appealing state 
court injunction prohibiting defendant's use of plaintiff's work on grounds that federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright matters); Burnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 486 
N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct.) (seeking summary judgment of plaintiff's state claims on federal copy­
right preemption grounds), modified, 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1985) (dismissing with 
prejudice), affd mem., 492 N.E.2d 1231 (N.Y. 1986); Arch Music Co. v. Gladys Music, Inc., 
231 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over 
copyright questions); Schrut v. News Am. Publishing, 474 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (seek­
ing dismissal of contract claim for unauthorized use of copyrighted photograph). 
4. E.g., Wagner v. B.C. Wagner Group, Inc., No. 90-6097, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16372 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1990) (seeking to remand contract claims for unauthorized use of 
trade name and work product). 
5. See. e.g., Elan Assocs. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (charging copyright infringement in assignor's reassertion of music copyrights). 
6. See. e.g., Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) (attacking assignment of copyright renewal rights as tainted by fraud and overreaching). 
7. E.g., Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (producer 
allegedly assigned film distribution rights twice); Peay v. Morton, 571 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1983) (songwriter allegedly assigned rights to another after transferring copyright to 
plaintift). 
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righted work is unpermitted and infringing because such use was limited 
by the terms of a contract?8 
The federal courts of appeals have confronted this question in a 
number of recent cases. Many have concluded that federal jurisdiction 
exists, reversing district court judgments of dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.9 Despite these repeated attempts to resolve the mat­
ter, however, this question continues to confound the courts, which lack 
a clear approach to defining when a claim arises under the copyright laws 
for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Although numerous courts of ap­
peals and district courts have analyzed the issue, the Supreme Court has 
never specifically addressed this question. to Lower courts determining 
8. Copyright jurisdiction issues also arise in other contexts, such as disputes between 
purported coauthors ofa work. In Harrington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the 
court held that a suit to establish rights of co-ownership in a copyrighted work did not arise 
under the copyright laws because it did not constitute a suit for infringement. Id. at 657-58. 
The court observed that "Congress left a considerable residue of power in the state courts to 
pass on 'copyright questions'-among them, questions arising in contract and title disputes." 
Id. at 658; see also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding dispute be­
tween partners over rights in copyrighted work created through partnership should be resolved 
by state partnership law and did not arise under the copyright laws since coauthors cannot sue 
each other for infringement); cf. Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding 
action to establish joint authorship of a work arose under copyright laws because decision 
required construction of § 201(a) of Copyright Act); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 F. 
Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same). This Article focuses on the paradigm case and variations 
described supra text accompanying notes 2-7. For general discussions of copyright jurisdic­
tion, see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 13.2­
13.2.2.4 (1989), and 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 12.01[A] (1991). 
9. E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990); Ves­
tron, 839 F.2d at 1380; Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987); Topolos v. 
Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983). Contra Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035 (11th Cir. 
1989) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after district court judgment on 
merits); Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see 
infra notes 144-177 and accompanying text. 
10. The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of federal jurisdiction over copy­
right matters, see, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 360 (1908), and once 
held that a suit based on common-law copyright in an unpUblished work (as distinguished 
from a suit based on federal statutory copyright) did not arise under the copyright laws of the 
United States for purposes of determining whether that case fit within its own appellate juris­
diction, see Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 164 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1896). lurisdictionallimi­
tations due to common-law copyright no longer exist, however, as Congress provided in its 
1976 revision of the copyright laws, Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & SUpp. II 1990», that the federal copy­
right statute preempts all state laws providing equivalent rights and that federal copyright 
applies to all works "fixed in a tangible medium of expression," whether published or not. See 
id. sec. 101, § 301(a), 90 Stat. at 2572 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988». The Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed the scope of federal jurisdiction over claims affecting works 
protected by federal copyright. 
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the scope of copyright jurisdiction have thus relied on two related lines of 
Supreme Court precedent: Cases arising under the patent laws for pur­
poses of 28 U.S.C. § 1338; and cases arising under the laws of the United 
States for purposes of the federal question jurisdiction provided in 28 
U.S.c. § 1331. 11 Unfortunately, these precedents are so unclear that the 
question of when a case arises under federal law has been described as 
"[t]he most difficult single problem in determining whether federal ques­
tion jurisdiction exists."12 The lower courts have only exacerbated the 
problem by attempting to draw analogies from these inconsistent prece­
dents to govern copyright jurisdiction. 
This issue has great practical and theoretical significance. Clear 
guidelines for deciding whether to sue in state or federal court would be 
of substantial practical value to a lawyer preparing to file a lawsuit. 13 
11. Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1331 (1988). The jurisdiction conferred by sections 1331 and 1338 is further limited by and 
based upon Article III of the United States Constitution, which provides: "The judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ...." U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It is well settled that the constitutional phrase "arising under" is 
broader in scope and includes far more cases than does the same language used in 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1331. See. e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983); see also 
William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under 
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 891 (1967); Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason 
for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purpose of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.I. 597, 607-11 (1987); Paul I. Mishkin, The 
Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 160-63 (1953); A. Mark 
Segreti, Ir., Vesting the Whole "Arising Under" Power ofthe District Courts in Federal Preemp­
tion Cases, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 539, 539-40 (1984); Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal 
Claims: Preemption, Removal. and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 816-17 (1986); Richard E. Levy, Note, Federal Preemption. Re­
moval Jurisdiction. and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 636-37 
(1984); Ronald I. Mann, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise 
Tax Board Analysis, 62 TEX. L. REV. 893, 897 (1984). 
12. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED­
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 17 (2d ed. 1984). The Supreme Court made a 
similar observation in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 8 (1983), quoted infra text accompanying note 33; see also Cohen, supra note 11, at 890; 
Doernberg, supra note 11, at 598; Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism. Judicial Power and the 
"Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.I. 563, 
563 (1981); Twitchell, supra note 11, at 816-17. 
13. When diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, of course, plaintiff's counsel 
can be confident that she may bring suit in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) ("The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in contro­
versy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... 
citizens ofdifferent States ...."). Even then, however, she cannot determine whether she must 
file the case in federal court because she will remain uncertain as to the existence of exclusively 
federal copyright jurisdiction under current approaches. 
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Litigants and society would benefit by spending less time and money on 
the determination of jurisdictional questions. This issue also raises im­
portant theoretical questions of federalism and the appropriate role of the 
federal courts in determining matters related to the copyright laws. The 
time has come to consider this issue more thoroughly and to develop 
coherent guidelines for deciding whether a claim arises under the copy­
right laws. 
In the past decade the Supreme Court has rendered several decisions 
addressing when a case arises under federal law, and in Christianson v. 
Colt Industries Operating Corp. it addressed the specific question of when 
a case arises under the patent laws.14 Although the Court has yet to 
consider copyright jurisdiction directly, its recent decisions in these 
analogous areas may provide better guidance to the lower courts. These 
decisions also allow the courts to consider whether copyright claims 
present any unique problems that call for a different analysis in determin­
ing whether a case arises under the copyright laws. 
Part I of this Article analyzes 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338 and some 
of the Supreme Court decisions that shed light on their meaning. Part II 
reviews the cases that have specifically focused on copyright jurisdiction. 
Drawing heavily on Supreme Court decisions in the patent jurisdiction 
and federal question jurisdiction areas, the lower courts have developed 
two principal and inconsistent approaches to this question. One group of 
courts attempts to discern the heart of the case and the plaintiff's purpose 
in bringing it, while the other looks only to the language of the plaintiff's 
complaint. As Part III then explains, each of these approaches is seri­
ously flawed. After reviewing alternative methods that scholars have 
proposed for determining federal question jurisdiction, Part III analyzes 
the purposes and policies underlying copyright law and the counter­
vailing state interests in contract law. Based on this review, this Article 
concludes that courts should resolve questions of copyright jurisdiction 
by testing the relative weight of these federal and state interests. Federal 
courts should exercise jurisdiction over all cases in which federal copy­
right law interests outweigh state contract law concerns. Finally, Part 
III describes how courts should weigh these interests in some typical 
copyright jurisdiction conflicts to insure that the important federal copy­
right matters are heard in federal court, while allowing state courts to 
decide cases in which state interests predominate. 
14. 486 U.S. 800, 807-13 (1988); see infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text. 
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]f. Supreme Court Analyses of General Federal Question and 
Patent Jurisdiction 
A. General Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Title 28, section 1331 of the United States Code gives the federal 
district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."ls Granting the fed­
eral courts original jurisdiction over such matters principally serves to 
ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of federal law 
and to protect against antifederal bias in the state courts. 16 Despite their 
clear understanding of federal question jurisdiction's purposes, federal 
courts have long struggled to define when an action arises under federal 
law according to section 1331.17 It has been said that "[t]here is no sin­
gle rationalizing principle that will explain all of the decisions" that con­
strue this section. IS Certain doctrinal principles have developed, 
however, to help determine whether a case falls within the federal courts' 
jurisdiction as defined by section 1331. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). 
16. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the Supreme Court 
recognized these concerns in discussing its own appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions 
raising federal or constitutional questions. Justice Story observed: 
The constitution has presumed ... that state attachments, state prejudices, state 
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control ... the regular 
administration of justice.... 
This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most 
sincere respect for state tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over 
their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of 
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of 
the constitution. 
Id. at 347-48. Over 100 years later, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti­
cals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), amplified this theme in the specific context of 
section 1331: 
Congress granted the district courts power to hear cases "arising under" federal law 
in order to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be interpreted more cor­
rectly and applied more uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that the 
availability of a federal forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would 
make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way that Congress 
intended. 
Id. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan also remarked that "[a]nother reason Congress 
conferred original federal-question jurisdiction on the district courts was its belief that state 
courts are hostile to assertions of federal rights." Id. at 827 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For 
similar arguments, see Doernberg, supra note 11, at 646-50, Hornstein, supra note 12, at 564­
65, Segreti, supra note 11, at 539-42, and Levy, supra note 11, at 636. 
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
18. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 3562, at 19. 
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The most important of these principles is the well-pleaded complaint 
rule. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley19 is generally consid­
ered the most prominent early Supreme Court case recognizing this prin­
ciple.20 In that case, the railroad had agreed to issue free lifetime passes 
to the plaintiffs in exchange for a release from liability for damages the 
latter had sustained in a train wreck. When the railroad failed to renew 
the passes as agreed, the plaintiffs sued to enforce the settlement. The 
plaintiffs' complaint alleged, in addition to the above facts, that a federal 
statute did not prohibit the railroad from distributing the passes (as the 
railroad had claimed) and, further, that if the federal statute did prohibit 
the distribution, then the statute violated the Fifth Amendment.21 
The Supreme Court dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, reasoning that 
a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only 
when the plaintiff's statement of his cause of action shows that it is 
based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the 
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and as­
serts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitu­
tion of the United States.22 
Thus, according to the well-pleaded complaint rule stated in Mottley, 
courts must determine whether a case "arises under" federal law solely 
on the basis of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by reference to any 
defenses that the plaintiff may anticipate therein or that the defendant 
may later raise in responsive pleadings. This rule treats issues raised by 
way of defense as too removed from the core of the case to justify taking 
the matter out of state COurt.23 
A second line of precedent grants the federal courts jurisdiction over 
cases presenting state law claims in which a federal issue is a necessary 
element. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., a shareholder sued to 
enjoin a corporation from purchasing bonds issued under the authority of 
a federal statute that plaintiff claimed was unconstitutional.24 The 
19. 211 u.s. 149 (1908). 
20. A complete treatment of the well-pleaded complaint rule's development is beyond the 
scope of this Article. The following discussion is intended to provide an overview of the cur­
rent principles and policies that underlie determinations of federal question jurisdiction. For 
more complete analyses, see 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & CoOPER, supra note 12, §§ 3562-3566 
(2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1992), Doernberg, supra note 11, at 611-26, Hornstein, supra note 12, at 
602-13, and Twitchell, supra note 11, at 817-21. 
21. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 150-51. 
22. ld. at 152. 
23. See id. at 152-53. 
24. 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921). 
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Supreme Court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction, 
reasoning: 
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or statement 
of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or 
application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that 
such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable 
foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under [the federal ques­
tion] provision.25 
Since the plaintiff's claim implicated the constitutionality of a federal 
statute, the Court determined that federal question jurisdiction arose 
from the necessity of construing the Constitution and the statute.26 
The Supreme Court reviewed these two bases for federal question 
jurisdiction in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust. 27 There the Court held that no federal question jurisdiction ex­
isted over a suit brought by a state agency to enforce state tax laws, even 
though the state sought a declaratory judgment that its claim was not 
preempted by federallaw.28 After the state sued in state court to collect 
unpaid state taxes and for a declaration that the federal Employee Retire­
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)29 did not preempt the ac­
tion, the defendant, a trust established to administer the vacation 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, removed the case to fed­
eral district court,30 which ruled for the state on the merits. The Ninth 
25. Id. at 199. 
26. Id. at 202. Justice Holmes dissented from this jurisdictional holding, reasoning that 
the plaintiff shareholder's claim against the directors was based on state corporate law rather 
than federal law: 
The mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a criterion or test, when 
the law of the United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under 
the state law to be also a case under the law of the United States .... 
Id. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes's view has not prevailed. If the resolution 
of a state law claim requires the court to construe a federal law that allows a private right of 
action, federal question jurisdiction exists over the matter. See infra notes 27-57 and accompa­
nying text. 
27. 463 U.S. I (1983). 
28. Id. at 28. 
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. II 1990), as amended by 
Rural Telephone Cooperative Associations ERISA Amendments Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-89, 105 Stat. 446. 
30. The district courts exercise removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 
& Supp. II 1990), which provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original juris­
diction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of 
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending. 
28 U.S.c. § 1441(a). In order for a case to be removable under section 1441, therefore, it must 
be one that the plaintiff could have initiated in federal court. It was once well settled that a 
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Circuit then reversed without addressing the jurisdictional issue,3! and 
the state appea1ed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the case had been 
improperly removed because there was no basis for federal jurisdiction.32 
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction. While recognizing that "the statutory phrase 'arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States' has resisted 
all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which 
cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of 
the district courts,"33 the Court relied on the well-pleaded complaint rule 
to determine that the plaintiff's claim did not arise under federal law: 
[A] federal court does not have original jurisdiction over a case in 
which the complaint presents a state-law cause of action, but also as­
serts that federal law deprives the defendant of a defense he may raise, 
or that a federal defense the defendant may raise is not sufficient to 
defeat the claim.34 
The Court acknowledged that this rule "may produce awkward results, 
especially in cases in which ... the only question for decision is raised by 
a federal pre-emption defense,"3s but nevertheless held that the well­
pleaded complaint rule correctly mandated those results. Thus, even in 
those cases that present only a federal preemption question, there is no 
federal question jurisdiction unless the plaintiff's claim itself arises under 
federallaw.36 
The Court then carefully analyzed the true nature of the plaintiff's 
claims and found that they arose under state, not federal, law.37 The 
federal court could exercise removal jurisdiction under this statute only upon finding that the 
state court froni which the cause was removed had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the 
parties. See, e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) 
("The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdic­
tion. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal 
court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had jurisdic­
tion.");see also Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 (1943). Congress eliminated this 
inefficient rule in 1986 by amending section 1441 to include subsection (e), which provides: 
"The court to which such civil action is removed is not precluded from hearing and determin­
ing any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil action is 
removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (added by Act of June 
19, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3(a), 100 Stat. 633, 637). 
31. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 
1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). Judge Tang argued in dissent that there was no federal 
subject matter jurisdiction to support removal to the district court. [d. at 1309 (Tang, J., 
dissenting). 
32. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4-7. 
33. [d. at 8. 
34. [d. at 10 (citations omitted). 
35. [d. at 12. 
36. See id. at 13-14. 
37. The Court concluded that neither the plaintiff's underlying tax enforcement claim nor 
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Court commented that it decided these matters with "an eye to practical­
ity and necessity":38 
The situation presented by a State's suit for a declaration of the valid­
ity of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit of necessity and 
careful limitation of district court jurisdiction that informed our statu­
tory interpretation [of the Declaratory Judgment Act] to convince us 
that, until Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within the 
original jurisdiction of the United States district courts. 39 
Thus, one cannot invoke federal jurisdiction simply by seeking a declara­
tory judgment on a question of federal law, even when the question is 
whether that federal law preempts the state law action.40 
its declaratory judgment count arose under federal law. The plaintiff expressly brought claims 
under state statutes-the first under the state tax code and the second under the state declara­
tory judgment act. The Court saw the first claim as a straightforward state tax law matter and 
nothing else. [d. at 13. Although it found the declaratory judgment count more difficult to 
characterize, the Court refused to treat it as arising under federallaw. [d. at 14. The Court 
decided that a state declaratory judgment action that implicated federal issues could serve as 
the basis for federal court jurisdiction only if that same action could have been brought under 
the federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, ch. 512,48 Stat. 955 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988)). Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 18-19. Applying this new rule, 
the Court considered its own precedent in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 
667 (1950). The Skelly Court had ruled that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not provide 
jurisdiction over cases in which the federal question arose only in a defense to the underlying 
state law claim. [d. at 672-74; see also Mann, supra note 11, at 899-901. Rather than follow 
Skelly, the Franchise Tax Board Court decided that federal jurisdiction would exist under the 
federal Declaratory Judgment Act only upon a finding that the declaratory action defendant 
could have brought an action for coercive relief on the basis of federal law. See 463 U.S. at 19. 
The hypothetical coercive action at issue there, a suit based on ERISA to enjoin the collection 
of state taxes, clearly would have been a federal cause of action that the defendants might have 
brought in federal court. See id. at 19-20. In spite of this, the Court concluded that the 
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action did not arise under federal law because Congress had 
not required that coercive actions against such hypothetical defendants be brought in federal 
court and thus had not so completely preempted the law with respect to trusts created under 
ERISA as to justify taking the case out of the state courts. See id. at 21-22, 25; see also Mann, 
supra note 11, at 906-08. 
38. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20. 
39. [d. at 21-22. 
40. The Court recognized, however, that removal to federal court would be appropriate 
in some cases in which federal law completely preempted the state law's field of operation. [d. 
at 23-24. In criticizing the Franchise Tax Board decision, Professor Mary Twitchell described 
the necessary intertwining of determinations of arising under jurisdiction and federal preemp­
tion defenses: since both require some substantive analysis of the complaint's nature, it is often 
difficult if not impossible to decide the jurisdictional issue without also deciding the preemp­
tion question. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 851-52. She argued that federal courts should 
take jurisdiction over removed cases to perform a full substantive analysis of the preemption 
issue whenever an express federal cause of action corresponds to the plaintiff's claim and there 
is a reasonable possibility that the former would preempt the latter. See id. at 857-69; see also 
Segreti, supra note 11, at 546-58 (arguing that federal preemption implicates constitutional 
concerns relating to the Supremacy Clause and should therefore be determined by federal 
courts). 
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Although the Court might have based its result in Franchise Tax 
Board on this analysis alone, it also recognized that federal jurisdiction 
exists when "it appears that some substantial, disputed question of fed­
erallaw is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. "41 
In other words, the Court reaffirmed the second basis for federal question 
jurisdiction-that which it first identified in Smith v. Kansas City Title & 
Trust CO.42 
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,43 the Court dis­
cussed this second basis in greater depth. The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow, 
who had ingested the drug Bendectin while pregnant, brought actions in 
state court against the manufacturer alleging that the drug caused their 
children to have birth defects.44 Among other things, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendant's alleged failure to comply with labeling re­
quirements imposed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA)4S created a rebuttable presumption of negligence under state 
law.46 The defendant removed the case to federal district court, which 
denied plaintiff's motion for remand. The Sixth Circuit reversed, how­
ever, holding that the case did not fall within federal question jurisdic­
tion. The Supreme Court agreed.47 
The Court first discussed the well-pleaded complaint rule and its 
interpretation of that rule in Franchise Tax Board.48 After observing 
that federal law did not create any of the claims asserted in the com­
plaint, the Court went on to consider whether "the vindication of a right 
under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal 
law."49 It reasoned that allowing a private remedy in federal court for 
violations of the FDCA would run counter to Congress's intent in enact­
ing that statute because, as the parties had agreed, the FDCA provided 
no express or implied private right of ac!,ion for violations of its terms. 
As the Court stated: 
We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional 
intent to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise 
federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that 
federal statute solely because the violation of the federal statute is said 
41. Franchise Tax Ed., 463 U.S. at 13. 
42. 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see supra text accompanying notes 24-26. 
43. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
44. ld. at 805. 
45. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & 
Supp. II 1990)). 
46. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806. 
47. ld. at 806-07. 
48. See id. at 807-08. 
49. ld. at 808-09 (quoting Franchise Tax Ed., 463 U.S. at 9). 
348 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 
to be a "rebuttable presumption" or a "proximate cause" under state 
law, rather than a federal action under federal law. 50 
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's reliance on federal 
law as an element of one of its state law claims presented a substantial 
federal question, the Court explained that Congress's "determination 
that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal 
statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a 
claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is 
insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction."51 
Thus, the Court held that there must be a sufficient level of substantiality 
to the federal element in the state law claim in order to establish federal 
question jurisdiction over a case, and it tested that substantiality by 
whether Congress had created a private right of action, either expressly 
or implicitly, for violations of the relevant federal law. 
Justice Brennan, who had authored the Franchise Tax Board opin­
ion, dissented in Merrell Dow. Rejecting the majority's conclusion that 
the federal issue was insufficiently substantial, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, would have found a federal 
question to arise from the need to construe a federal statute as an element 
of the plaintiff's case. 52 He emphasized federal question jurisdiction's 
purpose to ensure uniformity in the construction of the federal laws. 53 
When federal law becomes an element of a state claim, he reasoned, that 
federal law must be interpreted so that individuals can comply with its 
terms in order to avoid liability under state law.54 Justice Brennan 
concluded: 
[T]he possibility that the federal law will be incorrectly interpreted in 
the context of adjudicating the state-law claim implicates the concerns 
that led Congress to grant the district courts power to adjudicate cases 
involving federal questions in precisely the same way as if it was fed­
eral law that "created" the action. 55 
Justice Brennan thus took a broader view than the majority. Although 
he apparently would not find federal question jurisdiction to arise either 
from a defense anticipated in the complaint or from a prayer for a declar­
atory judgment that federal law does not preempt a state law claim, he 
would find it when the plaintiff's underlying claim necessitates construc­
tion of a federal law. The majority, on the other hand, would limit that 
50. Id. at 812. 
51. Id. at 814. 
52. Id. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54. Id. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdiction to cases in which the federal question raised by the state law 
claim meets a higher standard of substantiality. 
Thus, in Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the two traditional bases for federal question jurisdiction: A 
case arises under the laws of the United States when the court finds from 
the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint (1) that the claim is ex­
pressly or implicitly created by federal law, or (2) that a violation of fed­
erallaw considered sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction 
forms a necessary element of the plaintiff's state claim. 56 Furthermore, 
in both cases the Court seemed willing to go beyond the face of the com­
plaint to determine the true nature of the plaintiff's claims. 57 
56. Many commentators have criticized the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Supreme 
Court's application of it in Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow. Professor Donald 
Doernberg, for example, argued that the rule ignores the underlying purposes of federal ques­
tion jurisdiction: to ensure consistent interpretation of federal law and avoid any effects of 
state court hostility to federal law. Denying federal courts the power to decide federal issues 
that are raised by way of defense, he reasoned, undermines these goals by forcing the various 
state court systems to resolve these federal concerns. See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 646-63. 
For other criticisms, see Cohen, supra note l1, at 895-916, Hornstein, supra note 12, at 606-13, 
Segreti, supra note 11, at 544-54, and Twitchell, supra note 11, at 818-34, 846-54. The applica­
tion of this rule to eases arguably implicating issues of copyright law raises similar problems. 
See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text. 
57. The Court has struggled over the proper analytical approach to determining when a 
plaintiff's claim arises under federal law. In some eases, the Court literally looked only at the 
face of the complaint, while in others it delved deeper into the nature of the claim to see if it 
was essentially federal. For example, in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 
366 U.S. 656 (1961), the Court followed a formalistic rather than a functional analysis. The 
plainttif in that ease sued in state court to secure a refund of overpayments for natural gas 
supplied to plaintiff by the defendant gas company pursuant to a contract between the parties. 
The defendant claimed that the state court lacked jurisdiction because the ease arose under the 
federal Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958), which granted the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the rates for supplying natural gas. Pan Am. 
Petroleum, 366 U.S. at 657. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that because the 
plaintiff's complaint was explicitly based on state common law, the state court was not divested 
of jurisdiction, even though plaintiff's claim involved natural gas rates that were subject to 
federal control. ld. at 662-63. The Court reasoned: 
[Q]uestions of exclusive federal jurisdiction and ouster ofjurisdiction of state courts, 
are under existing jurisdictional legislation, not determined by ultimate substantive 
issues of federal law. The answers depend on the particular claims a suitor makes in 
a state court-on how he easts his action .... 
. .. It is settled doctrine that a ease is not cognizable in a federal trial court ... 
unless it appears from the face ofthe complaint that determination of the suit depends 
on a question of federal law. 
ld. (emphasis added); see also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, l12-13 (1936) ("To 
bring a ease within the [removal] statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or 
the laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause 
of action .•. and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face ofthe complaint, unaided by 
the answer or the petition for removal." (emphasis added». 
By contrast, in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Supreme 
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B. Patent Jurisdiction 
Title 28, section 1338(a) of the United States Code gives the district 
courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under the 
copyright and patent laws.58 Today section 1338(a) is in some ways su­
perfluous,59 given that a claim arising under any act of Congress falls 
within the jurisdictional scope of section 1331 as an action arising under 
federallaw. 60 Significantly, however, Congress had expressly granted the 
federal courts jurisdiction over patent matters as early as 179361 and had 
extended jurisdiction to cover copyright matters by 1819,62 but did not 
Court affinned the lower courts' orders denying the plaintifrs motion to remand after defend­
ant removed the case to federal court. As in Pan American Petroleum, the plaintiff in Avco had 
sued in state court for relief under state contract law, based on its collective bargaining agree­
ment with the defendants. In finding that the case arose under federal law (specifically, section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964», the Avco Court was 
clearly willing to go beyond "the face of the complaint." See Avco, 390 U.S. at 559-60. Simi­
larly, in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), the Court held that an 
action seeking a declaratory judgment that a contract between the parties had not been tenni­
nated for failure to receive a certificate required by federal law did not arise under federal law, 
even though the plaintiff brought the suit under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Look­
ing beyond the face of the complaint, the Court detennined that the case really involved only a 
common-law contract claim in which federal issues would arise only by way of defense. Id. at 
672; see also Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (holding removal 
jurisdiction proper when plaintiffs had first unsuccessfully sued on federal antitrust grounds in 
federal court and then made similar claims in state court on the basis of state law, because "at 
least some of the claims had a sufficient federal character to support removal" and because 
artful pleading should not detennine the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
In Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow, the Court seemed to embrace this latter, func­
tional approach. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 857-70; Levy, supra note 11, at 657-59; 
Mann, supra note 11, at 906-22. 
58. See supra note 1. For a general overview of § 1338(a), see 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & 
COOPER, supra note 12, § 3582 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1992). 
59. Section 1338(a) is not superfluous, however, to the extent that it provides for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction, which section 1331 does not. 
60. See supra note 11; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1058 
n.9 (7th Cir. 1986), modified, 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
61. The Patent Act of 1793 provided that infringement actions could be brought in the 
United States Circuit Courts "or any other court having competent jurisdiction." Ch. 11, § 5, 
1 Stat. 318, 322. For more on the history of patent jurisdiction, see Donald Shelby Chisum, 
The Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. 
L. REV. 633, 634-38 (1971). 
62. Section 1338 followed earlier acts of Congress that granted the federal district courts 
original and then exclusive jurisdiction over copyright matters. Prior to 1819, the copyright 
statutes allowed actions for copyright infringement to be brought "in any court having cogni­
zance thereof," Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125-26, or "in any court having 
competent jurisdiction thereof," Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3,2 Stat. 171, 171-72. In 1819, 
Congress provided that the Circuit Courts of the United States were to have "original 
cognisance, as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies, and cases, arising 
under any law of the United States, granting or confinning to authors or inventors the exclu­
sive right to their respective writings, inventions, and discoveries." Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 
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authorize general federal question jurisdiction until it passed the Judici­
ary Act of 1875.63 Thus, Congress recognized a need for federal courts 
to decide matters of patent and copyright law long before it supported 
federal court interpretation of federal laws in general. 
Although section 1338(a) and its predecessors have a long history, 
the Supreme Court has never addressed the application of these jurisdic­
tional statutes to copyright matters; it has on several occasions, however, 
interpreted their application to patent matters. A review of some of the 
Court's leading cases in this area shows that it has relied on many of the 
same principles to define patent jurisdiction in the context of section 
1338(a) and its predecessors as it has to determine general federal ques­
tion jurisdiction. 
The Court first faced an issue related to patent jurisdiction in Wilson 
v. Sandford.64 In Wilson the Court considered not original jurisdiction, 
but section 17 of the Act of 1836, which provided a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court in matters arising under any federal law "granting or 
confirming to inventors the exclusive right to their inventions or discov­
eries."65 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had lost its rights to 
use a patented invention under a license agreement by reason of its al­
leged failure to comply with the agreement's payment terms.66 The 
Court decided that the claim neither arose under any federal law nor 
depended for its decision "upon the construction of any law in relation to 
patents."67 Rather, it viewed the dispute as growing out of the parties' 
contract: "The rights of the parties depend altogether upon common law 
and equity principles."68 The Court accordingly concluded that it was 
19, 3 Stat. 481, 481. In 1873, the second edition of the Revised Statutes provided explicitly 
that such jurisdiction was to be exclusive of the courts of the states. Rev. Stat. § 711 para. 5 
(1878) (codifying Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 55, 56, 58, 106, 16 Stat. 198, 206, 207, 215, 
which provided only for original jurisdiction over patent and copyright matters in federal 
court). Congress again provided for such exclusive jurisdiction by Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 
231, § 256 para. 5, 36 Stat. 1087, 1160 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988». 
63. Ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. As Justice Brennan observed in Merrell Dow, "In the 
early days of our Republic, Congress was content to leave the task ofinterpreting and applying 
federal laws in the first instance to the state courts ...." 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). Although Congress had once before established general federal question juris­
diction, in the "Midnight Judges Act," Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, that 
statute was repealed the following year by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1,2 Stat. 132, 132. For 
more on the history of federal question jurisdiction, see Doemberg, supra note 11, at 601-07, 
Mishkin, supra note 11, at 157, Segreti, supra note 11, at 539-42, and Mann, supra note 11, at 
896-97. 
64. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850). 
65. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 359, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124. 
66. Wilson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 99-100. 
67. Id. at 101. 
68. Id. at 102. 
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without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 69 Wilson stands for the principle 
that not every case that concerns a patent-or by analogy, a copyright­
is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If the case involves first 
and foremost a claim based on a contract, the mere fact that the contract 
concerns some patented or copyrighted matter does not establish federal 
jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided in The Fair v. Kohler Die & Spe­
cialty Co. 70 that a claim would arise under the patent laws if the plaintiff 
could frame it as such, notwithstanding that the underlying dispute be­
tween the parties was arguably in the nature of contract. The plaintiff in 
The Fair had sold its patented devices to a jobber on the condition that 
they be retailed for at least one dollar and fifty cents. The defendants, 
after buying the devices from the jobber with notice of this condition, 
resold them for less than that amount. The plaintiff alleged that the de­
fendants had thereby infringed its exclusive rights under the patent laws. 
The defendants responded that the federal courts had no jurisdiction 
over the matter because the patent laws did not give patent owners the 
right to impose such price restrictions.7 1 
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, found jurisdiction 
to exist because "the plaintiff sued upon the patent law, so far as the 
purport and intent of the bill is concerned. . .. [I]t charged an infringe­
ment of its patent rights in general terms, and it sought triple damages, 
which it could have done only by virtue of the statute."72 The Court 
focused on the plaintiff's pleadings and the nature of the relief sought to 
determine whether the claim arose under the patent laws. As Justice 
Holmes reasoned: 
Of course the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law 
he will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he will bring a 
"suit arising under" the patent or other law of the United States by his 
declaration or bill. That question cannot depend upon the answer, and 
accordingly jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the defense, even when 
anticipated and replied to in the bill. Conversely, when the plaintiff 
bases his cause of action upon an act of Congress, jurisdiction cannot 
be defeated by a plea denying the merits of the claim.73 
Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim was based primarily on the plain­
tiff's private arrangement with the jobber and, through the jobber, the 
defendants,74 the Court treated it as a patent claim because the plaintiff 
69. Id. 
70. 228 u.S. 22 (1913). 
71. Id. at 23-24. 
72. Id. at 24. 
73. Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
74. The plaintiff's lack of privity with the defendants would have defeated any claim 
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had alleged patent infringement rather than breach of contract in its 
complaint.7s The Court did not consider the merits of the claim relevant 
to the determination of jurisdiction.76 
The Court reemphasized the role of the plaintifrs pleading in defin­
ing the nature of the dispute three years later in 4merican Well Works 
Co. v. Layne & Bowler CO.77 The plaintiff in that case brought suit in 
state court for libel and injury to its business, claiming that the defendant 
had falsely and maliciously accused it of violating the defendant's patents 
in a pump and certain related parts. The defendant removed the case to 
federal court on the theory that it arose under the patent laws and the 
state court therefore had no jurisdiction.7s 
based on contract law. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding 
copyright owner could not enforce price restriction against third party purchaser with whom it 
had no privity of contract). This might have affected the Court's willingness to find federal 
jurisdiction to hear the patent claim in The Fair. 
75. See The Fair, 228 U.S. at 25. 
76. Courts must distinguish between motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris­
diction based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), and motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. 
Although arguments pertaining to the merits of the plaintiff's claim or the evidence upon 
which it is based are not relevant to the question of subject matter jurisdiction, as Justice 
Holmes recognized in The Fair, 228 U.S. at 26, a Court may properly consider them in the 
context of either a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary 
judgment. As the Court explained in Bell v. Hood: 
Jurisdiction ... is not defeated ... by the possibility that the averments might 
fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is 
well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on 
the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint 
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just 
as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed juris­
diction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to deter­
mine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then 
dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. 
327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). For a discussion of the clliference between motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim and motions to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, see 5A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1350, at 196-200 n.8 (2d ed. 1990). Some courts considering motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction have ignored this distinction, improperly reaching the merits of the 
plaintiff's claim in order to determine the jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Wolfe v. United 
Artists Corp., 583 F. Supp. 52, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction after concluding that the conduct alleged as infringement by plain­
tiff was not cognizable as infringement under the copyright laws); cf. Malinowski v. Playboy 
Enters., 706 F. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying a clliferent standard of inquiry for 
determining subject matter jurisdiction in context of summary judgment motion than in con­
text of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); infra note 155 (discussion of 
MalinowskI). 
77. 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
78. Id. at 257-58. 
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The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Holmes, again writing for 
the Court, held that "[a] suit for damages to business caused by a threat 
to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law."79 
Holmes reasoned that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause 
of action. The fact that the justification may involve the validity and 
infringement of a patent is no more material to the question under what 
law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract."80 Here 
the Court again focused on the complaint to detennine whether the suit 
arose under the patent laws; defenses raised by the answer could not vest 
a federal court with jurisdiction, even if they required the court to inter­
pret the validity of a patent. In Wilson, The Fair, and American Well 
Works, therefore, the Court decided whether the case arose under the 
patent laws by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule-looking only at 
the surface and fonn of the complaint. 
The facts that the Court faced in Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,8! how­
ever, revealed one of the problems with this approach: What to do when 
the plaintiff alleges both contract and patent claims? The plaintiff in 
Luckett, who owned patents for the manufacture of union suits, had 
granted licenses to the defendants to use those patents in exchange for 
royalties and the defendants' promise to promote the sale of the gannents 
manufactured pursuant to the patents.82 The plaintiff's federal suit al­
leged that the defendants had violated the licenses on all counts, and 
further that the defendants had infringed on the plaintiff's patent rights 
by continuing to manufacture the suits after breaching the contract. In 
its prayer for relief, the plaintiff requested not only damages and the roy­
alties due under the license agreement; it also asked for an injunction to 
prevent future manufacture and sales of its patented gannents by the de­
fendants and a reassignment to it of all rights to the patented invention. 83 
Relying heavily on Wilson v. Sandford, the Court ruled that the dis­
trict court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.84 Observing that the "main and declared 
purpose" of the complaint was "to enforce the rights of the plaintiff 
under his contracts with defendants," the Court held that 
a suit by a patentee for royalties under a license or assignment granted 
by him, or for any remedy in respect of a contract permitting use of the 
79. Id. at 259. 
80. Id. at 260. 
81. 270 U.S. 496 (1926). 
82. Id. at 500. 
83. Id. at 500-02. 
84. Id. at 511. 
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patent is not a suit under the patent laws of the United States, and can 
not be maintained in a federal court as such.85 
After reviewing the plaintiff's argument that intervening precedents had 
narrowed the scope of Wilson,86 the Court articulated a standard for de­
termining whether a case arises under the patent laws: 
If in [Wilson] the patentee complainant had based his action on his 
patent right and had sued for infringement, and by anticipation of a 
defense of the assignment had alleged a forfeiture by his own declara­
tion without seeking aid of the court, jurisdiction under the patent laws 
would have attached, and he would have had to meet the claim by the 
defendant that forfeiture of the license or assignment and restoration of 
title could not be had except by a decree of a court . . .. But when the 
patentee exercises his choice and bases his action on the contract and 
seeks remedies thereunder, he may not give the case a double aspect, so 
to speak, and make it a patent case conditioned on his securing equita­
ble relief as to the contract.87 
Thus, even though the plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged patent in­
fringement, the Court treated the claim as based on contract and not 
arising under the patent laws. In effect, the Court diluted the notion that 
the party that brings the suit is the "master to decide what law he will 
rely upon"88 by disregarding the plaintiff's explicit reliance on the patent 
laws. The Court regarded the plaintiff's inclusion of the contract claim 
as an election to waive any claim under the patent laws. 
Although the lower courts have frequently construed Luckett,89 the 
Supreme Court did not return to the question of patent jurisdiction until 
85. Id. at 502. 
86. The Luckett Court distinguished Geneva Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Karpen & 
Bros., 238 U.S. 254 (1915), Healy v. Seagull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915), The Fair v. 
Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913), Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), 
Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282 (1902), and White v. Rankin, 
144 U.S. 628 (1892), noting that in each of those cases the plaintiffs had alleged facts regarding 
a license only in anticipation of the defendant's use of such license in defense, but had not 
included claims based on the license agreement per se. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 504-11. 
87. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 511. As applied to patent cases in which the claims involve the 
terms of an assignment or license, Professor Donald Chisum described the Luckett standard as 
"Pleader's Choice." See Chisum, supra note 61, at 645-48. He concluded that regardless of 
how the case is pleaded, "the actual litigation will take the same shape. In either the state or 
the federal litigation the primary issue will be the licensor's breach." Id. at 647. Professor 
Chisum also argued, however, that cases presenting issues of patent validity or patent infringe­
ment should be considered within the jurisdiction of the federal courts as "arising under" the 
patent laws. Id. at 658-66. 
88. The Fair, 228 U.S. at 24, quoted supra text accompanying note 73. 
89. For example, in Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981), the court relied 
on Luckett in concluding that the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged fraud, contract, and 
patent infringement claims, did not arise under the patent laws. Id. at 718. Similarly, the 
court in Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon Paper Manufacturing Co., 125 F.2d 565 (7th 
Cir. 1942), found a complaint that asked for determinations both of title and of patent iufringe­
ment not to arise under the patent laws. Citing Luckett, the court reasoned: "If ... the action 
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1988, when it decided Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 90 
Christianson's long history began when a former employee of Colt, the 
leading manufacturer and seller of M 16 rifles, set about competing with 
Colt in sales of M16s. Colt sued Christianson and others in federal court 
for allegedly infringing patents used in manufacturing the rifles, but later 
voluntarily dismissed its claims.91 
Christianson then sued Colt in federal court, claiming violations of 
the antitrust laws and tortious interference with business relations. Ac­
cording to Christianson's pleadings, Colt falsely told its customers that 
Christianson had stolen its trade secrets, and by this and other methods 
had driven Christianson out of the rifle business.92 Colt's patents were 
invalid for failure to comply with certain requirements of the patent stat­
ute, Christianson argued, and by taking advantage of these invalid pat­
ents, Colt had lost any claim to trade secret protection under state law. 
Under this theory, Christianson could not have violated any of Colt's 
trade secrets, and Colt's representations to that effect were therefore 
false. 93 
is one in which the plaintiff asks affirmative relief as a basis for his right to relief for infringe­
ment, then the action is not one arising under the patent laws." Id. at 566; see also Air Prods. 
& Chems. v. Reichhold Chems., 755 F.2d 1559, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir.) (finding case arose under 
patent laws based on Luckett, noting that "the court must focus on the facts plead, and the 
relief requested, by the plaintiff in the complaint," whereas the district court erred by "charac­
terizing issues as primary or secondary"), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 929 (1985); cf Koratron 
Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding based in part on 
Luckett that claim did not arise under patent laws because even though plaintiff could have 
framed it in patent terms, plaintiff chose to plead the case as a common-law action, "strained 
out all patent infringement language from its pleading," and did not seek relief provided by the 
patent laws), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970). Numerous other courts have applied Luckett. 
See, e.g., Clausen Co. v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 889 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying 
patent jurisdiction based on Luckett), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2174 (1990); Boggild v. Kenner 
Prods., 853 F.2d 465, 468 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting Luckett's conclusion that contract dis­
putes involving patents do not arise under the patent laws). 
Other courts, however, have ignored these distinctions. See, e.g., McKnight v. Akins, 192 
F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1951) (finding patent jurisdiction when plaintiff alleged two counts, one for 
breach of contract and the other for infringement resulting from that breach); Research Fron­
tiers Inc. v. Marks Polarized Corp., 290 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding licensee's suit 
against patent owner for breach of exclusive license agreement to be a claim for patent in­
fringement and within federal patent jurisdiction); International Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. 
Co., 235 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.C. 1964) (finding exclusively federal patent jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to pay royalties required by license agreement because 
the claim required court to determine whether defendant had infringed patent before deciding 
whether royalty obligation existed). For a general discussion of subject matter jurisdiction in 
patent litigation, see 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 21.02[1] (1991). 
90. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
91. Id. at 804-05. 
92. Id. at 805. 
93. Id. at 806. 
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Agreeing with this chain of reasoning, the district court entered 
judgment for Christianson.94 In reaching its conclusion, the district 
court declared nine of Colt's patents invalid.9s It took jurisdiction over 
the matter, however, based on the diversity jurisdiction statute96 and the 
antitrust statutes,97 not section 1338(a).98 
Colt appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the 
basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(I), which gives that circuit "exclusive juris­
diction ... of an appeal from a final decision of a district court ... if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 
1338."99 Since the underlying case arose in part under the patent laws, 
Colt argued, the district court's jurisdiction had been based on section 
1338, and section 1295(a)(I) therefore vested exclusive jurisdiction over 
the appeal in the Federal Circuit. Christianson moved for a transfer of 
the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631,100 arguing that the case did not 
arise under the patent laws. The Federal Circuit granted Christianson's 
motion in an unpublished order and transferred the appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit.101 
The Seventh Circuit, however, agreed with Colt that the case arose 
under the patent laws. Evaluating Colt's defense as to the truth of its 
statements about the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, would re­
quire it to determine the validity of Colt's trade secrets, which in tum 
would force it to consider the validity of Colt's patents and thus to apply 
94. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 613 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (C.D. Ill. 
1985), transferred, 798 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1986), modified, 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), 
vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
95. ld. at 331. 
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988), quoted supra note 13. 
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) ("The several district courts of the United States are in­
vested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title ...."); 
id. § 15(a) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any­
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States 
in the district in which the defendant resides ...."); id. § 26 (providing for injunctive relief in 
such cases). 
98. See Christianson, 613 F. Supp. at 331. 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988). This grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal 
Circuit only applies, however, to appeals of cases invoking the patent or plant-variety protec­
tion laws; it has no effect on appeals of cases arising only under the copyright or trademark 
laws. See id. 
100. 	 This section provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever ... an appeal ... is noticed for or filed with [a court of appeals] and 
that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the 
interest of justice, transfer such ... appeal to any other such court in which the ... 
appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed .... 
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988). 
101. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th Cir. 1986), 
modified, 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
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and interpret the patent laws.102 The Seventh Circuit accordingly trans­
ferred the case back to the Federal Circuit. 
The Federal Circuit still viewed the case as not arising under the 
patent laws, because Christianson did not base his claims on the patent 
laws and could only raise patent issues in response to or anticipation of 
Colt's possible defenses. 103 A case in which patent issues appear only in 
response to a defense, the court reasoned, is not a case that "arises 
under" the patent laws. 104 Even though the Federal Circuit believed it­
self without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, "the interest of justice" led it 
to decide the case on the merits, reversing the district court's judgment 
for Christianson. 105 Christianson then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court decided that the case did not arise under the 
patent laws and that the Federal Circuit consequently had no jurisdiction 
over the appeal. 106 After recognizing the necessary relationship between 
cases construing section 1338 and those construing section 1331 's general 
federal question jurisdiction, Justice Brennan reasoned for the major­
ity lO7 that the Court's rulings in Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow 
applied to the case before it: 
Linguistic consistency ... demands that section 1338(a) jurisdiction 
likewise extend only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint 
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or 
that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
102. Id. at 1061-62. The court observed that Congress granted the Federal Circuit exclu­
sive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in order "to provide greater uniformity in the 
substantive law of patents and to prevent the inevitable forum shopping that results from con­
flicting patent decisions in the regional circuits." Id. at 1058. The court also noted that such 
appellate jurisdiction required only a finding that the lower court could have exercised its 
original jurisdiction based in part on section 1338, even if other jurisdictional bases also ex­
isted. Id. at 1058 n.9. Although Christianson primarily addresses appellate jurisdiction based 
on 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(I), its analysis of that section amounts to an interpretation of section 
1338(a) because appellate jurisdiction under section 1295(a)(I) turns on a finding as to whether 
the district court could have based its original jurisdiction on section 1338(a)(I). 
103. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 822 F.2d 1544, 1551-53 (Fed. Cir. 
1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
104. Id. at 1552-53. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that as long as 
jurisdiction could have been based in part on section 1338(a), the presence of other bases for 
jurisdiction would not defeat its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 1551 n.8, 1553. The 
Federal Circuit also agreed that Congress had given it exclusive jurisdiction over patent ap­
peals in order to promote consistent interpretation of the patent laws, but it did not share the 
Seventh Circuit's willingness to treat any issue or argument involving patents as sufficient to 
justify finding the case as a whole to arise under the patent laws. See id. at 1551-52. 
105. Id. at 1560. 
106. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 813, 819. 
107. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Blackmun joined. There 
were no dissents. 
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substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a neces­
sary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.tOS 
Consistent with Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow, Justice Brennan 
then observed that it was not enough to anticipate a patent law defense in 
the complaint; rather, patent law had to either create the cause of action 
or comprise a necessary element of one of the claims pleaded by the 
plaintiff. tOO Although he might have ended his analysis there, Justice 
Brennan went one step further and ruled that "a claim supported by al­
ternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for section 
1338(a) jurisdiction unless the patent law is essential to each ofthose the­
ories."110 In other words, merely raising a patent issue would not estab­
lish federal jurisdiction over a case that could be decided without ever 
reaching that patent issue. As applied to Christianson, in which the 
plaintiff could recover on antitrust or common-law tort claims without 
ever reaching the patent validity-trade secret theory, this new rule meant 
the case did not arise under the patent laws. Distinguishing between 
"theories" and "claims," the Court reiterated that a patent issue is suffi­
cient to vest the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction under section 
1338 only if it constitutes an essential element of a c1aim.111 Because 
none of Christianson's claims met this standard, the Court transferred 
the case back to the Seventh Circuit for decision on the merits.1l2 
108. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09. The Court thus implicitly rejected Professor 
Chisum's suggestion that the courts construe "arising under the patent laws" more liberally for 
section 1331 than for purposes of section 1338(a), a construction that would allow federal 
courts to take jurisdiction under section 1331 in some cases raising patent issues without man­
dating that such jurisdiction be exclusively federal, as under section 1338(a). See Chisum, 
supra note 61, at 670-71. 
109. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809-10. This reasoning complements the Court's holding in 
Me"ell Dow. In Me"ell Dow, the Court denied jurisdiction because Congress had not pro­
vided any private remedy for violations of the federal law relied on by the plaintiffs state law 
claim. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. In Christianson, the Court did not have to 
decide whether patent law provided a private remedy because it concluded that the plaintiffs 
claims did not require construction of patent law. 486 U.S. at 810. Patent law, however, 
clearly provides private remedies; thus if the complaint had made construction of the patent 
laws necessary, the Court presumably would have found federal jurisdiction to exist. 
110. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (emphasis added). 
Ill. Id. at 812-13. Justice Brennan's Christianson opinion can be reconciled with his Mer­
rell Dow dissent on the basis of this theory-claim distinction. In Merrell Dow, Justice Brennan 
believed construction of the federal statute to be an essential element of the plaintifrs state tort 
claim because state law derived a rebuttable presumption of negligence from a violation of 
federal law; he rejected the majority's conclusion that Congress's failure to create a private 
remedy for violations of that statute rendered the issue insubstantial. See 478 U.S. at 824, 831 
(Brennan, J. dissenting). In Christianson, by contrast, Brennan reasoned that the plaintiff 
could recover on antitrust or tort claims without ever invoking the patent law as an essential 
element of either cause of action. See 486 U.S. at 810-13. 
112. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819. Adopting much of the Federal Circuit's analysis, the 
Seventh Circuit then decided that Colt's patents were valid and, just as the Federal Circuit had 
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In summary, by its Christianson decision, the Court reaffirmed the 
viability of the well-pleaded complaint rule and its collateral principles as 
applied to patent jurisdiction: patent jurisdiction exists only if patent law 
creates or is a necessary element of the action; federal jurisdiction cannot 
derive from a defense raised in the answer or anticipated in the com­
plaint; and a mere theory of liability requiring construction or applica­
tion of the patent laws does not establish patent jurisdiction, unless that 
patent law theory is an essential element of the plaintiff's state law claim. 
For all that, however, the Court left unclear how to determine whether a 
specific case in fact arises under the patent laws. For example, the Chris­
tianson Court did not address the implications of cases like Luckett, in 
which one of the plaintiffs claims explicitly invoked the patent laws, but 
the Court decided that the case did not arise under the patent laws be­
cause the plaintiff had also included a claim based on contract law. l13 
This type of problem continues to tum up in the copyright context. 
That is, when a plaintiff brings both contract and copyright infringement 
claims, how should the court determine whether the case arises under the 
copyright laws for purposes of section 1338(a)? How can one tell in such 
a case whether federal copyright law either creates the claim or amounts 
to a necessary and substantial element of the state law contract claim? 
H. Cases on Copyright Jurisdiction 
The most influential precedent specifically addressing when a case 
arises under the copyright laws is T.E. Harms Co. v. EliscU. 114 That case 
involved a conflict over the right to royalties from a musical composition. 
The plaintiff had obtained certain rights by assignment from the com­
done, reversed the district court's judgment for Christianson. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989). 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. 
114. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). Two pre-Eliscu deci­
sions from the Southern District of New York have also had considerable influence on other 
courts. In Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the 
plaintiffs asked the court to invalidate their assignment of their rights to renew the copyrights 
to works written by their father, claiming that the defendant had procured the assignments by 
fraud and in breach of fiduciary duties owed them. Id. at 254-55. Notwithstanding the plain­
tiffs' argument that the need to determine the validity of the assignments implicated important 
copyright concerns, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reason­
ing: "Whether an action is one over which jurisdiction has been conferred on the federal 
courts by Congress must be determined from its nature and foundation and does not depend 
on the remote possibility that during its future course some question under the copyright laws 
may incidentally arise." Id. at 260; see also Muse V. Mellin, 212 F. Supp. 315, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) ("The primary and controlling purpose of the complaint is to secure an interpretation of 
the various assignments of the one-third interest. Of such suits the federal courts lack jurisdic­
tion."), affd, 339 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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poser of the music; the defendant had coauthored the song's lyrics. The 
dispute focused on whether the defendant had assigned his rights in the 
lyrics to the plaintiff for the renewal term. lIS After the defendant 
brought a state court action for a declaration ofhis rights to royalties, the 
plaintiff filed suit in federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), 
seeking equitable and declaratory relief. 116 The district judge dismissed 
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Second Cir­
cuit affirmed in a panel opinion by Judge Henry Friendly.1l7 
After observing that "a layman would doubtless be surprised to 
learn" that the case did not arise under the copyright laws, Judge 
Friendly noted that precedent in the federal question and patent jurisdic­
tion areas had narrowly defined the scope of federal courts' jurisdic­
tion. IIS He then outlined a test for whether a claim arises under the 
copyright laws: 
Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area, we 
think that an action "arises under" the Copyright Act ifand only if the 
complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, ... or asserts a 
claim requiring construction of the Act, . . . or, at the very least and 
perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of 
the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the 
claim. The general interest that copyrights, like all other forms of 
property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is not enough to meet 
this last test.1l9 
Judge Friendly'S criteria reflect the two principal bases for federal ques­
tion jurisdiction. The first-where federal law creates the claim-ap­
pears in Judge Friendly's recognition of copyright jurisdiction over 
claims seeking a remedy granted by the copyright statute. The second 
basis-where federal law is a necessary element of a state law claim­
corresponds to the second and third prongs of Friendly'S test, which ap­
prove copyright jurisdiction over claims requiring construction of the 
copyright statute and in cases over which federal copyright policy 
controls. 
Applying this test, the Eliscu court first decided that the plaintiff 
presented no claim for infringement and had not requested any remedy 
granted under the Act, since the defendant had neither used nor 
threatened to use the copyrighted work.120 Second, none of the claims 
115. Eliscu, 339 F.2d at 824-25. 
116. ld. at 825. 
117. ld. at 829. 
118. ld. at 824. 
119. ld. at 828. 
120. ld. at 825. 
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required interpretation of any provision of the copyright statute. 121 Fi­
nally, the court determined there was "not the slightest reason to think 
that any legal question presented by Harms' complaint [fell] in the 
shadow of a federal interest suggested by the Copyright Act or any other 
source."122 
Although he accordingly concluded that the federal courts lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case at hand, Judge Friendly also 
took note that the courts had exercised copyright jurisdiction in cases in 
which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had forfeited rights granted 
by license to use a work and had then continued to use the work any­
way.123 That is, when the plaintiff does not simply seek royalties or a 
declaration of rights, but complains about a particular use, then copy­
right jurisdiction may exist. Even in those cases, however, the courts will 
find jurisdiction only "if the plaintiff has directed his pleading against the 
offending use, referring to the license only by way of anticipatory replica­
tion, but not if he has sued to set the license aside, seeking recovery for 
unauthorized use only incidentally or not at all."124 
Since the Eliscu decision, many federal courts have relied on Judge 
Friendly's test for copyright jurisdiction. 125 Interestingly, however, ap­
plications of his test have often produced inconsistent results. The courts 
have developed two distinct approaches to this question: Some examine 
the plaintiff's claims in depth in order to discern their principal and con­
trolling purpose or issue; others look more to the surface of the com­
plaint in applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
A. The "Principal and Controlling Issue" Test 
Some courts frequently resolve questions of copyright jurisdiction 
according to what may be called the "principal and controlling issue" 
test. Under this approach, courts attempt to determine whether the case 
involves a genuine copyright claim or is simply a contract dispute. In a 
121. Id. at 827. 
122. Id. at 828. 
123. Id. at 825. 
124. Id. 
125. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969-70 (4th Cir. 
1990); Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988); Royal v. Lead­
ing Edge Prods., 833 F.2d 1,2 (1st Cir. 1987); Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1987); Daniel Wilson Prods. v. 
Time-Life Films, 736 F. Supp. 40, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Joseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. 
United States Dev. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 673, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Wolfe v. United Artists 
Corp., 583 F. Supp. 52, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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sense, these courts try to glean the plaintiff's true purpose or motive in 
bringing the lawsuit from her pleadings. 
The "principal and controlling issue" test originated in the Southern 
District of New York case of Elan Associates v. Quackenbush Music, 
Ltd. 126 The plaintiff in Elan had allegedly obtained the exclusive rights 
to publish and copyright several songs written by Carly Simon by con­
tracting with the defendant, a corporation partly owned by Simon. 
Claiming that the contract only covered one song, not several, Simon 
reasserted her rights to the other songs and, together with the defendant, 
brought a state court action against the plaintiff to void the contract as 
tainted by fraud. The plaintiff then filed a suit in federal court that 
charged the defendant with infringing the copyrights it had allegedly 
transferred to the plaintiff through the contract. 127 The district court 
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
explaining: 
Upon a careful reading of the plaintiff's complaint, the court finds 
that the principal and controlling issue involved in this action concerns 
a determination of proper title to the copyright in Simon's seven songs. 
The resolution of this dispute ultimately depends upon the validity of 
the plaintiff's exclusive publishing agreement with Simon, which is 
presently being litigated in the New York court. In short, although the 
action is cast in terms of infringement, in reality the suit is merely one 
to establish valid title by seeking to enforce a contract between an au­
thor and a publisher. 128 
Similarly, in Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc., 129 the plaintiff 
ha.d assigned its copyright in two works to the defendant. After the de­
fendant allegedly failed to comply with some conditions of this assign­
ment, including payment of royalties, the plaintiff sued, arguing that 
defendant's breach effected a forfeiture of its rights to use the works and 
that defendant's continuing use thus constituted infringement. Because 
the plaintiff also requested relief under state contract and unfair competi­
tion laws, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of sub­
ject matter jurisdiction. 130 The court granted the motion, reasoning that 
"the formal allegations of the complaint must yield to the substance of 
the claim."131 The court viewed the essence of the plaintiff's case as a 
contract claim: 
126. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
127. See id. at 461-62. 
128. ld. at 462. 
129. 442 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
130. See id. at 32-33. 
131. ld. at 33. 
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Thus the fundamental controversy involves interpretation of the two 
agreements to determine whether the right of reversion exists, and if so 
whether in fact there has been a breach of either agreement which 
would warrant reversion of the copyrights to the plaintiff. The pri­
mary and controlling purpose of the complaint is to reestablish plain­
tiff, under its claimed right of reversion for an alleged breach, as owner 
of the copyrights in the [works]. As such, the complaint clearly does 
not fall within the areas described by Judge Friendly as affording fed­
eral jurisdiction. 132 
The district court in Berger v. Simon & Schuster!33 followed the 
same reasoning to a similar result. The plaintiff in that case had written 
a diet book and granted the defendant certain publication and distribu­
tion rights in the book. After the plaintiff enjoyed considerable success 
with a second book published elsewhere, the defendant republished the 
first book in order to capitalize on that success. The plaintiff's federal 
suit claimed that the defendant had breached the contract, resulting in a 
reversion to the plaintiff of the rights granted by the agreement, and that 
the defendant had thus infringed the copyright by republishing the 
book.!34 The court viewed the substance of the case as an action in con­
tract, even though the complaint was "framed entirely in terms of in­
fringement,"!35 and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Any decision on infringement would follow automatically and depend 
entirely upon the resolution of the underlying contract claim, the court 
reasoned.!36 The court further observed: 
If the sole test of federal jurisdiction is what the complaint alleges 
without more, the action is clearly a copyright infringement suit as 
plaintiff asserts. But it is disingenuous to assert that the contract ex­
pired by its own terms on the facts present here. Plaintiff cannot es­
cape the consequences of there being a contract dispute simply by 
pretending in his complaint to ignore what lies at the heart of the 
controversy.!37 
In Berger, as in Elan Associates and Stepdesign, the court interpreted 
Eliscu as requiring it to assess the true nature of the plaintiff's claim 
rather than to focus on the face of the complaint alone.!38 
132. Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
133. 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
134. See id. at 915, 916. 
135. Id. at 917. 
136. See id. at 917-18. 
137. Id. at 918-19. 
138. Several other decisions from the Southern District of New York also followed this 
approach. See. e.g, Bear Creek Prods. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (treat­
ing plaintiffs claim that copyright reverted to it by reason of defendant's breach of assignment 
contract as a contract claim, in spite of complaint's allegation of copyright infringement); 
Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919,921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding 
claim that copyright reverted to plaintiff because of defendant's breach of contract conditions 
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The Second Circuit recently indicated its approval of the Southern 
District's approach in these cases. In Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, 
Inc. ,139 the court of appeals out1ined a three-step method for determining 
whether copyright jurisdiction exists over a case in which the plaintiff has 
alleged both breach of contract and copyright infringement: 
A district court must first ascertain whether the plaintiff's infringement 
claim is only "incidental" to the plaintiff's claim seeking a determina­
tion of ownership or contractual rights under the copyright. If it is 
determined that the claim is not merely incidental, then a district court 
must next determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of a con­
dition to, or a covenant of, the contract licensing or assigning the copy­
right. . .. [I]f a breach of a condition is alleged, then the district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction. But if the complaint merely alleges a 
breach of a contractual covenant in the agreement that licenses or as­
signs the copyright, then the court must undertake a third step and 
analyze whether the breach is so material as to create a right of recis­
sion in the grantor. If the breach would create a right of recission, 
then the asserted claim arises under the Copyright ACt. I40 
Although the court concluded that the insufficiency of the record on ap­
peal prevented it from applying this test to the case before it,141 the out­
1ine of the test reveals a strong interest in determining the real purpose of 
the lawsuit. The Second Circuit's concern with whether or not the in­
fringement claim is "incidental," the first prong of its test, and its ap­
proval of and reliance on the Southern District's Berger decision142 
signify its general agreement with the "principal and controlling issue" 
test. 143 
to be a dispute over title rather than one arising under the copyright laws); Keith v. Scruggs, 
507 F. Supp. 968, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding plaintiff's claim to co-ownership of copyright 
on banjo instruction book and record album written pursuant to a contract with defendant to 
be a claim for breach of contract rather than a copyright claim). In Lukasewych v. Wells, 
Rich, Greene, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), a photographer sued an advertising 
agency for allegedly using his photographs without paying him as required by a contract, and 
Judge Charles Haight ruled that the case did not arise under the copyright laws. Id. at 1094. 
Judge Haight based his conclusion both on the face of the complaint, which included a sepa­
rate breach of contract count, and on an analysis of the underlying claim, which he perceived 
as a dispute over the contract payment terms. See id. at 1093-94. 
139. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992). The merits of Schoenberg's underlying claim were not 
at issue in this appeal. The opinion focused on the validity of a contempt citation issued 
against the defendant's lawyer for failing to comply with a discovery order. In challenging the 
contempt order, the lawyer asserted that the district court had lacked subject matter jurisdic­
tion because the case did not arise under the copyright laws. Id. at 927. 
140. Id. at 932-33 (citations omitted). 
141. Id. at 933. 
142. Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), construed with ap­
proval in Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 931-32; see supra text accompanying notes 133-137 (discus­
sion of Berger). 
143. For a discussion of the elaboration on the "principal and controlling issue" test re­
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Other courts have also used the "principal and controlling issue" 
test. For example, in Royal v. Leading Edge Products,l44 the First Cir­
cuit adopted a similar approach in upholding the lower court's dismissal 
of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case in­
volved a complicated contractual arrangement between the parties. The 
defendant had hired the plaintiff in 1982 as its manager of word process­
ing development. The following year, plaintiff and a co-worker entered 
into a separate agreement with the defendant to develop a software pack­
age for the latter in exchange for royalties. This royalty agreement al­
lowed the defendant to stop paying royalties if it fired the plaintiff for 
cause; if it terminated plaintiff without cause, however, defendant would 
have to continue royalty payments for five years after the date of termi­
nation. Otherwise, royalties would apparently continue for as long as the 
plaintiff worked for the defendant. The defendant fired plaintiff in 1986, 
and did not pay plaintiff any royalties after that date. 145 
The plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that he was fired 
without cause and that defendant's nonpayment of royalties therefore 
constituted a breach of contract. The plaintiff also claimed, however, 
that he co-owned the copyright in the software that he had developed for 
the defendant, and sought a declaratory judgment to that effect and an 
accounting of profits based upon the co-ownership.146 
Despite the inclusion of this claim based on copyright, the First Cir­
cuit concluded that "[i]t can scarcely be argued that appellant's claim, in 
its very nature and essence, is one for breach of contract."147 The court 
saw the claim as nothing more than a suit for nonpayment of royalties, 
commenting: 
we must parse causes of action as they are, not as the pleader might 
fondly wish they were .... Accordingly, we decline appellant's invita­
tion to dance at a masquerade ball. We will not assume jurisdiction 
over what is essentially a garden-variety contract dispute, notwith­
fleeted by the second and third steps of the Schoenberg analysis, see infra notes 234-249 and 
accompanying text. 
144. 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). 
145. See id. at 1-2. 
146. See id. at 2. The plaintiff claimed co-ownership on the theory that the defendant, by 
wrongfully firing him, relinquished ownership of the copyright as a "work made for hire." 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant's breach of the employment contract entitled the plain­
tiff to rescind the employment agreement and claim the copyright. The court noted some 
support in the case law for this theory, but nevertheless concluded that this argument could 
not serve as the basis for copyright jurisdiction. Since the compensation for plaintiff's work on 
the software came in the form of royalties, not wages, the court found plaintiff's work made for 
hire argument inapplicable. See id. at 3. 
147. [d. at 4. 
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standing Royal's heroic efforts to costume it in the guise of a copyright 
action. 148 
In Topolos v. Caldewey,149 the Ninth Circuit used the "principal and 
controlling issue" test in concluding that copyright jurisdiction existed. 
The plaintiff in Topolos had written a book about Napa Valley wineries, 
which the defendant agreed to publish. The publishing agreement re­
quired the defendant to pay plaintiff royalties and to register the copy­
right in the work in the plaintifrs name. The defendant instead 
registered the copyright in its own name, later published a revised ver­
sion of plaintifrs book, also listing itself as the copyright owner, and then 
published a third book by a different author on the same subject. ISO 
In his federal suit, plaintiff claimed ownership of the copyright in 
the original book and charged the defendant with infringing that copy­
right by publishing the later revised edition and the book by the new 
author. lSI He also alleged breach of contract. lS2 The district court 
viewed the case as a dispute over copyright ownership and dismissed the 
complaint. ls3 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that ownership 
was a threshold question but not in fact the principal question. Since the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's two later publications infringed his 
copyright, the court reasoned, a finding on the infringement issue would 
not follow automatically from the resolution of the ownership dispute, 
but would require a separate inquiry. While recognizing that the title 
question alone could not support jurisdiction, the court judged the need 
for this additional determination sufficient to vest the federal court with 
jurisdiction. ls4 
148. ld. at 5. 
149. 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983). 
150. ld. at 992. 
151. ld. at 995. 
152. ld. at 992. 
153. ld. at 993. 
154. See id. at 994. The case ofJoseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. United States Develop­
ment Corp., 601 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1985), provides another example of a court relying on 
the "principal and controlling issue" test to determine that copyright jurisdiction exists. The 
plaintiff in that case had created architectural plans under a contract with the defendant devel­
oper. The plaintiff alleged that after it had created the plans, the defendant breached the 
contract and then copied the plans, thus infringing the plaintifrs copyright therein. The de­
fendant moved to dismiss, arguing inter alia that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because 
the case, as a mere dispute over title, did not arise under the copyright laws. ld. at 674. The 
district court denied the motion and ruled that the case arose under the copyright laws. ld. at 
677. Reasoning that the pIaintifrs claim was for infringement, the court distinguished the case 
from Eliscu and Elan Associates, in which the "principal and controlling issue" had been own­
ership of the copyrights. See id. at 676-77. By contrast, the court in Dolch v. United CaIifor­
nia Bank, 702 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1983), held that plaintifrs suit to invalidate renewal 
assignments did not arise under the copyright laws, explaining: "The nature and scope of 
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Thus, courts using the "principal and controlling issue" approach 
willingly look beyond the face of the complaint to evaluate the true na­
ture of the dispute before them. ISS When they consider a case to be in 
renewal rights, as well as their assignability, are federal questions, but the conditions for valid 
assignment are not." Id. at 180. Similarly, in Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 
133 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the court refused to exercise copyright jurisdiction over a dispute that 
would have required it to decide whether the defendant had properly transferred distribution 
rights in copyrighted films to another, when defendant had obtained those rights through a 
contract with the plaintiff. The court judged that the outcome of the infringement question 
would follow automatically from its interpretation of the contract language and would require 
no examination of the works, unlike the situation in Topolos. See id. at 134-35; see also Peay v. 
Morton, 571 F. Supp. 108, 115 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding dispute over conflicting assign­
ments of copyright not to arise under the copyright laws, even though complaint included 
allegations of infringement, because "the determination of ownership [was], clearly, the princi­
pal purpose of the ... complaint"). 
155. The court in Malinowski v. Playboy Enterprises, 706 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Ill. 1989), 
also relied on the "principal and controlling issue" test in determining that a photographer's 
suit against the magazine that had hired him to take photographs was "a collection case in 
which the ownership of the copyright [was] essentially irrelevant." Id. at 616. The court 
conceded that "were this a Rule [12](b)(1) motion plaintiff would prevail on the jurisdictional 
argument," since plaintiff's complaint alleged a violation of his copyright and sought relief 
under the Copyright Act. Id. at 615. Because the defendant had raised the issue in a motion 
for summary judgment, however, the court concluded: "[W]e must look beyond the pleadings 
to see if this case really does arise out of the copyright law or whether the complaint might be 
an example of 'creative labelling.''' Id. (quoting Royal, 833 F.2d at 5). 
Contrary to the Malinowski court's reasoning, it is generally recognized that litigants 
should raise jurisdictional questions by motions to dismiss and not by motions for summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a 
party may move to dismiss for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction only under Rule 12(b)(1), not 
under Rule 56: "Seeking a summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue ... is the equivalent of 
asking a court to hold that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits. 
This is a nonsequitur."); Leaver v. Parker, 121 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1941) (holding that 
district court should have dismissed action for want of jurisdiction instead of entering sum­
mary judgment because whether action arises under patent laws is question of subject matter 
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 700 (1942); see also Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, 
Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883-84 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986); Boudloche v. 
Conoco Oil Corp., 615 F.2d 687, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1980); Thompson v. United States, 291 F.2d 
67, 68 (10th Cir. 1961); Peay, 571 F. Supp. at 110; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, 
§ 1350, at 206 n.22 (describing cases); 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2713, at 608-13, supp. at 130 (2d 
ed. 1983 & Supp. 1992) (same). Of course, a court must dismiss an action "[w]henever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Moreover, even in the context ofa Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the courts may look beyond the pleadings and 
consider affidavits and other evidence in order to determine the existence of subject matter 
jurisdiction. E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) ("[W]hen a question of the 
District Court's jurisdiction is raised ... the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into 
the facts as they exist."); Indium Corp., 781 F.2d at 884 ("In deciding such a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion, the court can consider ... evidentiary matters outside the pleadings."); Berardinelli v. 
Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37,39 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); Peay, 571 F. Supp. at 110 (noting 
that in passing on motions to dismiss for lack of copyright jurisdiction, "courts may consider 
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essence a dispute over title, these courts dismiss the action for want of 
jurisdiction regardless of whether the complaint includes a claim explic­
itly based on the copyright laws. 
B. The Face of the Complaint Approach 
Other courts, however, have applied the well-pleaded complaint rule 
in a more restrictive manner to determine whether a claim arises under 
the copyright laws. For example, in Effects Associates v. Cohen,156 the 
Ninth Circuit examined the language of the complaint and reversed the 
district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic­
tion. The plaintiff in that case had created several special effects, which 
the defendant allegedly used in its feature film. The plaintiff sued in fed­
eral court, alleging copyright infringement as well as fraud and deceit.157 
The lower court found the case did not arise under the copyright laws 
because "the principal and threshold issue to be resolved was a question 
of state contract law."158 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that 
"[t]he inclusion of a single paragraph ... alluding to an oral promise 
concerning the use of [plaintiff's] works, does not transform [plaintiff's] 
claim into one for breach of contract."159 The court focused on how the 
plaintiff had drafted the allegations in the complaint, observing that 
"plaintiff is master of his claim and in some cases will have the choice of 
framing his action either as one for infringement or for breach of con­
tract."I60 The plaintiff had decided to sue for infringement, the court 
concluded, and the existence of a defense based on a contract would not 
defeat copyright jurisdiction. 161 
In Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office,162 the Ninth Circuit again re­
lied on the well-pleaded complaint rule in reversing ~ dismissal for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff claimed to own 
the exclusive rights to distribute the films Hoosiers and Platoon on video­
cassette by virtue of a contract with the films' producer, Hemdale.163 
The plaintiff's arrangement with Hemdale had led to discord and litiga­
tion, as a result of which Hemdale claimed to have terminated the con-
affidavits and other competent documentary evidence, and resolve disputed jurisdictional fact 
issues"); see also 10 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra § 27l3, at 612-l3 (describing cases). 
156. 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987). 
157. [d. at 72-73. 
158. [d. at 73. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. 
162. 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). 
163. [d. at 1380-81. 
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tract. l64 Hemdale then assigned the exclusive videocassette rights to the 
defendant. When the defendant began to distribute the tapes, the plain­
tiff brought a federal suit charging the defendant with infringing its ex­
clusive distribution rights. 16s The defendant argued that its admission to 
the use complained of left the court to decide only which party, plaintiff 
or defendant, owned the videocassette rights. According to the defend­
ant, the case ultimately presented only the issue of which party had the 
valid contract with Hemdale, an issue of state contract law, and therefore 
did not arise under the copyright laws. Agreeing that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the case. 166 
The Ninth Circuit looked to the face of the complaint, found that 
the plaintiff had stated a claim based on and had sought relief under the 
copyright statute, and reversed the dismissal. The court considered the 
central role of the ownership question immaterial to the jurisdictional 
inquiry and observed that valid title is always an element of a copyright 
infringement claim.167 Although it acknowledged that some plaintiffs 
might bring federal copyright actions with the real intention of vindicat­
ing contract rights, the court resolved that federal courts should find 
copyright jurisdiction whenever the complaint properly states a claim 
based on the copyright laws. 168 
The Fourth Circuit recently adopted similar reasoning in Arthur 
Young & Co. v. City of Richmond. 169 The defendant in that case had 
hired the plaintiff to design and implement billing and customer informa­
tion software. Several problems arose between the parties during the 
course of their relationship, resulting in disputes over compensation. 
Eventually, the defendant locked the plaintiff out of the workplace, but 
continued to use the software it had created.17° In its federal suit,171 the 
plaintiff claimed ownership of the copyright in the software, charged the 
defendant with copyright infringement by continuing to use it,172 and 
164. [d. at 1381. Although Hemdale and the plaintiff had state court actions pending 
against each other, the Ninth Circuit adjudged those suits irrelevant to copyright jurisdiction 
in the matter at hand. See id. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. at 1382. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990). 
170. [d. at 968. 
171. The plaintiff initially sued in state court on common-law contract theories, but then 
filed the separate federal action that was the subject of the Fourth Circuit's opinion. See id. 
172. [d. at 969. The plaintiff also alleged in the alternative that regardless of which party 
owned the software, the defendant's use of the underlying source code constituted copyright 
infringement. [d. 
371 January 1993] COPYRIGHT JURISDICfION 
sought remedies provided by the copyright statute.173 The district court 
found that the case arose under state contract law and granted the de­
fendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 174 
The Fourth Circuit reversed, relying on Franchise Tax Board, 
Eliscu, and the well-pleaded complaint rule.17S The court held that the 
district court had erred by looking behind the complaint's allegations to 
determine whether the copyright claim was the "principal and control­
ling issue," reasoning: "The difficulty or centrality of those state law 
questions cannot defeat jurisdiction when the complaint shows that the 
claim for relief arises under a cause of action created by federal law." 176 
Because the complaint explicitly cited and relied upon provisions of the 
Copyright Act, the Fourth Circuit concluded, the case arose under the 
copyright laws.177 
In sum, unlike the courts that use the "principal and controlling 
issue" test, courts that follow the face of the complaint approach have 
173. The plaintiff sought damages for infringement and a permanent injunction pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502,504 (1988). Arthur Young & Co., 895 F.2d at 969. 
174. Arthur Young & Co., 895 F.2d at 969. 
175. See id. at 969-71. 
176. ld. at 971. 
177. The court distinguished those cases requiring courts to exanline disputes over juris­
dictional facts, because the case at bar presented only the legal question of whether the claim 
based on those facts was a copyright claim. See id. at 970-71; cJ. supra note 155 (noting that 
courts may resolve disputes over jurisdictional facts at any point in a case). 
Other recent decisions also reflect this approach and the influence of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule. See, e.g., Daniel Wilson Prods. v. Time-Life Films, 736 F. Supp. 40, 43 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding complaint including counts based on copyright and contract law to 
arise under the copyright laws: "Where a complaint alleges a federally conferred right, such as 
a copyright, a trademark or a patent, then alleges violations of that right and requests remedies 
provided by federal statute, this should be enough to confer federal jurisdiction."); Powell v. 
Green Hill Publishers, 719 F. Supp. 743, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding federal copyright juris­
diction based on Vestron and the well-pleaded complaint rule, even though plaintiff included 
count alleging material breach of contract by defendant); see also Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. 
Klone Mfg., 686 F. Supp. 86, 87-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding case to arise under federal trade­
mark statute and rejecting "principal and controlling issue" test as impractical when trade­
mark owner alleged that defendant continued to use trademark after license agreement was 
terminated for breach of its terms). On the other hand, the court in Borden v. Katzman, 881 
F.2d 1035 (11th Cir. 1989), seemed to misapply the well-pleaded complaint rule. In that case 
the plaintiff, the owner of the copyright in a translation done under contract with the defend­
ant, sued to establish his right to publish the translation. The district court had denied defend­
ant's motion to dismiss, holding that a suit to establish the right to publish, a right granted by 
the copyright laws, was a suit arising under the copyright laws. ld. at 1036-37. The Eleventh 
Circuit reversed on the ground that plaintiff had not alleged any infringement or attempted 
infringement by the defendant. ld. at 1039. According to the court, the determination of 
plaintitrs right to publish hinged on the resolution of defendant's argument that the plaintitrs 
exercise of such rights would constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty to the defendant, a state 
law matter. ld. at 1038. The court's willingness to look at defenses instead of the substance or 
surface of the complaint apparently conflicts with the principle established by Mottley and 
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detennined copyright jurisdiction solely on the basis of the fonn of plead­
ing chosen by the plaintiff. They consider the plaintiff's motivation or 
dominant purpose in pursuing the lawsuit irrelevant to the jurisdictional 
inquiry. 
III. Toward a Pragmatic Balancing Test for 

Copyright Jurisdiction 

The foregoing review of the various cases addressing when a claim 
arises under the copyright laws for purposes of federal jurisdiction 
reveals several problems with the two principal approaches adopted by 
the courts. Looking only at the face of the complaint has the advantages 
of clarity and relative predictability: if the complaint follows the appro­
priate fonnat and includes allegations of copyright infringement, the 
other cases affirming the well-pleaded complaint rule. Cf supra notes 19-57 and accompany­
ing text. 
Similar issues arise when the plaintiff sues in state court and frames the complaint solely 
in terms of breach of contract. State courts looking only at the face of the complaint take 
jurisdiction, while those probing for the essential purpose of the plaintiffs claims may well 
dismiss such cases as within the exclusive province of the federal courts. For example, in 
Burnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 486 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 
(App. Div. 1985) (dismissing with prejudice), affd mem., 492 N.E.2d 1231 (N.Y. 1986), the 
plaintiffs sued the defendant in state court for allegedly misappropriating their fictional charac­
ters in a television program, claiming that such use exceeded the scope of the parties' license 
agreement. The state trial court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
reasoning: 
While plaintiff [sic] purports to state a claim for breach of contract, in fact plaintiffs 
allege that defendants infringed their rights precisely because such rights were never 
contracted away. While defendants will no doubt eventually defend on the merits by 
referring to the contract of assignment, the nature of a potential defense does not 
define original jurisdiction and the Federal courts can and do entertain state law 
questions in federal copyright actions. 
While plaintiffs' complaint is exhaustive in attempting to assert State law claims, 
the court concludes that each of such claims is predicated on the notion that plain­
tiffs' rights in the play were never surrendered and defendants have infringed. Such 
claims are equivalent to the rights protected under Federal law. 
Id. at 616 (citation omitted); see also Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726, 727-28 (La. Ct. 
App. 1979) (dismissing suit to enjoin defendant from using plaintiffs copyrighted decals for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding such matters to be within exclusive jurisdiction of 
federal courts); Arch Music Co. v. Gladys Music, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Sup. Ct. 1962) 
(dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because corporate defendant was not a 
party to contract being sued upon and "principal and controlling purpose" was "copyright 
ownership and interference the exclusive jurisdiction of which is in the United States District 
Court"); Schrut v. News Am. Publishing, 474 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (dismissing 
action that charged defendant with using a photograph in breach of the parties' contract as 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts); cf Burke v. Pittway Corp., 380 N.E.2d 1,6 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding suit over defendant's alleged failure to comply with an agreement 
regarding patent applications and royalties to present a contract claim not arising under the 
patent laws), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979). 
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plaintiff can assume the federal courts will take jurisdiction. These ad­
vantages, however, pale in comparison to the potential costs of this ap­
proach. By requiring courts to defer to the plaintiff's. pleading choices, 
the well-pleaded complaint approach applied in such copyright decisions 
as Effects Associates, Vestron, and Arthur Young & Co. 178 might open the 
floodgates to allow more and more federal litigation of cases that are at 
heart contract disputes. In that event, the federal courts would find 
themselves bogged down with cases requiring interpretations of contract 
language and state contract law simply to reach at some ultimate point a 
matter-of-fact conclusion that behavior outside the bounds permitted by 
contract also infringes the copyright. The form of the pleadings alone 
thus should not be determinative. The Supreme Court's decisions in 
Franchise Tax Board, Merrell Dow, and Christianson demonstrate a 
greater concern with determining a claim's true nature and whether it 
contains an essential federal issue than with the formal content or struc­
ture of the complaint.179 Moreover, the face of the complaint approach 
gives short shrift to the second basis for federal jurisdiction reflected in 
the second and third prongs of Judge Friendly'S test: it does not allow 
courts to consider sufficiently whether copyright issues are essential to a 
178. See supra Part II.B. Others have recognized the possible benefits in clarity and effi­
ciency of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 11, at 821-22. Pro­
fessor Twitchell concluded, however, that courts inevitably must become more deeply involved 
in analyzing the complaint in order to prevent forum manipulation by the plaintiff. She there­
fore suggested that the courts identify those elements of a complaint actually necessary to state 
a federal claim and distinguish them from defenses to that claim. See id. at 823-31. Similarly, 
Professor Cohen conceded that the well-pleaded complaint rule "can be defended as a prag­
matic rule of necessity which permits the determination of jurisdiction when the complaint is 
filed," but concluded that the rule "operates blindly to preclude federal jurisdiction in cases 
where, as a matter of sound policy, the parties ought to be permitted to choose a federal 
forum." Cohen, supra note 11, at 894. Professor Cohen recommended a pragmatic approach 
that considers, among other factors, the centrality of the federal issues to the claims presented. 
See id. at 905-15; see also Doemberg, supra note 11, at 651-53 (noting impossibility of deter­
mining from the face of the pleadings alone whether there is an actual dispute regarding fed­
erallaw). 
179. See supra notes 27-57 and accompanying text. The Court's preference for substantive 
analysis of claims also appears in the artful pleading doctrine, which seeks to discourage forum 
manipulation, attempts by plaintiffs to avoid federal jurisdiction by deleting essential federal 
allegations from complaints. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1,22 (1983) ("[A] plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead neces­
sary federal questions in a complaint ...."); Mitchell v. Pepsi·Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 
342, 344 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A plaintiff may not avoid federal question jurisdiction ... by art­
fully omitting to plead federal questions essential to his or her right of recovery."), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Olguin v. Inspiration Conso!. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 
1984) (holding court can look outside complaint under artful pleading doctrine to consider 
facts omitted by plaintiff in attempt to defeat federal jurisdiction); see also 14A WRIGHT, 
MILLER & CoOPER, supra note 12, § 3722, at 266-78 (discussing forum manipUlation cases); 
Twitchell, supra note 11, at 825-31 (same). 
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state law claim based either on the need for statutory construction or on 
some distinct federal copyright policy. ISO 
To avoid the deficiencies inherent in the face of the complaint ap­
proach, courts should analyze the nature of claims. Serious flaws also 
appear, however, in the decisions following the "principal and control­
ling issue" test. A plaintiff can frame a complaint in copyright infringe­
ment terms and still find herself sent back to state court if a federal court 
concludes that the plaintiff's real purpose is to resolve a contract dispute. 
This test encourages courts to attempt to read the plaintiff's mind, to 
weigh the merits of the case to determine the real essence of the plaintiff's 
dispute with the defendant. Unfortunately, however, the cases offer no 
clear guidelines to follow or factors to weigh in making this determina­
tion. As a result, a party planning to file suit remains unable to predict 
whether or not the case belongs in federal court. The courts, in turn, 
must face frequent jurisdictional challenges to such claims, resulting in 
the consumption of valuable judicial resources on a question that is pe­
ripheral to the merits of the cases. 
The courts need a coherent, efficient framework for analyzing 
whether a particular dispute arises under the copyright laws. That 
framework should force the courts to consider both whether federal 
copyright law creates a claim and whether copyright law forms a neces­
sary element of a state law contract claim. In developing such a frame­
work, courts may find guidance in scholars' proposals for determining 
"arising under" jurisdiction in the context of section 1331. As described 
below, the pragmatic approach to general federal question jurisdiction 
described by Professor William Cohen proves instructive for the determi­
nation of copyright jurisdiction. lSI That approach leads us to consider 
the underlying state and federal concerns at stake in such determinations, 
and finally to a method for weighing these potentially conflicting 
interests. 
A. Scholarly Approaches to Federal Question Jurisdiction 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address all the scholarly 
comment that section 1331 and general federal question jurisdiction have 
inspired. A general overview of some of the most thoughtful commenta­
ries, however, helps to frame the discussion. For example, Professor 
Donald Doernberg recommended that the courts adopt an "outcome­
determinative" test for federal question jurisdiction. ls2 That is, he would 
180. Cf supra text accompanying notes 119-124. 
181. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
182. See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 656. 
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ask whether resolution of the federal issue will necessarily cause or pre­
vent any given result in the case. Such a test, he argued, "will insure that 
the parties will vigorously litigate the [federal] issue" and also "insures 
that the courts will not be asked to render advisory opinions in violation 
of the case-or-controversy clause:'183 
It is unclear how this test might function in the context of our para­
digm case.184 If we assume, for example, that the case will require an 
examination of the works at issue in order to determine whether the de­
fendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintifrs work and thus 
infringes the copyright in that work,185 we would then need to decide 
under the outcome-determinative test whether the resolution of the sub­
stantial similarity issue will determine liability in the case. In order to 
answer this question, however, the court may well need to consider 
whether the parties' contract allowed the defendant to use the work in 
the allegedly infringing manner. The court might find from this analysis 
that the contract permitted the defendant to use the work in any manner. 
In that event, the contract issue, not the substantial similarity issue, be­
comes outcome-determinative. Unfortunately, the court cannot make 
that determination without considering the merits of the case. Having a 
court determine the merits in order to determine jurisdiction is obviously 
inefficient and conceptually unjustifiable. 
Moreover, if the defendant has used the plaintifrs work in its en­
tirety and does not dispute substantial similarity, it might initially appear 
that liability will turn on a resolution of the contract issue alone. Since 
every assignment or license assumes that the assignor or licensor is the 
owner of a validly copyrighted work or of the rights conveyed, however, 
even the contract issues cannot be resolved without some consideration 
183. Id. at 657 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the constitutional prohibition of 
advisory opinions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-9 (2d ed. 
1988). Professor Doemberg also advocated the abandonment of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule and endorsed federal question jurisdiction over all cases presenting federal issues, regard­
less of whether they appear in the complaint or as a defense. See Doemberg, supra note 11, at 
656-63. Given the Supreme Court's recent opinions reaffirming the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, however, see supra notes 27-57 and accompanying text, this change is unlikely to occur. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8. 
185. In order to find copyright infringement, a court must conclude that the defendant 
had access to the copyrighted work allegedly infringed and that the defendant's work is sub­
stantially similar to the copyrighted work. See generally Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright 
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness o/Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719, 
728-34 (1987); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, §§ 13.02-13.03. Access is not an issue in 
the contract cases since the defendant, by contracting with the plaintiff, certainly has had an 
opportunity to see the copyrighted work. The parties are more likely to dispute substantial 
similarity, but the issue needs no court resolution if the defendant admits to using the identical 
work. 
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of copyright ownership and copyright validity, issues of federal copyright 
law. Thus, Professor Doernberg's test does not help settle the question of 
when our paradigm case arises under the copyright laws. 186 
Similar problems plague the hierarchical analysis promoted by Pro­
fessor Alan Hornstein. 187 Under his method, "the existence of arising 
under jurisdiction depends upon whether the federal element of the case 
is sufficiently anterior to other elements so that reliance on it will be nec­
essary to resolve the dispute."188 According to Professor Hornstein, a 
court must decide certain issues prior to others in any given case. When 
a party claims that a state statute violates the Federal Constitution, for 
example, the court will need to resolve, before reaching the federal issue, 
the anterior question whether the statute applies to the parties as a mat­
ter of state law. Since that state law issue is anterior to the federal issue, 
the case would not arise under federal law, according to Professor Horn­
stein, unless the result of the state law matter is sufficiently certain that 
the court will clearly have to decide the federal issue. 189 On the other 
hand, when the federal issue is anterior to the nonfederal issue, for exam­
ple, when a federal question appears as to the capacity of a party to sue 
or be sued, then arising under jurisdiction exists because the court must 
face that issue before it can reach the nonfederal issues. 190 This analysis 
would not apply, however, to cases in which the federal issue arises only 
in response to a defense. 191 
In the context of copyright jurisdiction, this hierarchical scheme 
would apparently treat every case involving a contract for use of a copy­
righted work as arising under the copyright laws. Since threshold ques­
tions arguably arise as to the plaintiffs ownership of a validly 
copyrighted work in every such case, analogous to the capacity to sue 
issue that Professor Hornstein discussed in the context of Osborn v. Bank 
186. Professor Doernberg's outcome-determinative test resembles the test oflogical neces­
sity criticized in Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978 (1979). 
The student author argued that requiring the federal issue to be 10gicalIy necessary to resolving 
the case would unduly restrict the scope of federal jurisdiction. As discussed below, the author 
advanced a test of substantial reliance on the federal issue as more appropriate. See infra note 
195. Professor Cohen also rejected the logical necessity or outcome-determinative approach to 
federal question jurisdiction. See Cohen, supra note II, at 898-99. 
187. See Hornstein, supra note 12. 
188. Id. at 566. 
189. See id. at 585-90. 
190. See id. at 579-84. 
191. Id. at 580-81. Like Professor Doernberg, Professor Hornstein would alIow federal 
defenses raised in the answer to establish federal question jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction, 
contrary to the welI-pleaded complaint rule. See id. at 602-13. As noted above, the courts are 
unlikely to make such changes. See supra note 183. 
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ofthe United States, 192 all of them would fit within Professor Hornstein's 
test of federal question jurisdiction, even though the issues of copyright 
ownership and validity may be uncontested and inconsequential to the 
real dispute in many of these cases.193 Such a test would therefore be 
overinclusive, allowing federal jurisdiction over virtually all cases involv­
ing a copyrighted work, contrary to the precedent established by T.B. 
Harms Co. v. EliscU 194 and other cases.195 
192. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see Hornstein, supra note 12, at 576-83 (arguing that 
Osborn "arose under" federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the Bank's capacity to 
sue was a necessary element of the claim and depended on federal law; the Court would thus 
have to rely on federal law to decide the case even if the parties did not dispute this issue). 
193. Professor Hornstein argued that federal question jurisdiction exists even when the 
parties do not dispute the anterior federal question: "[T]he fact that it is not necessary to 
resolve a federal question is not determinative of a federal court's original jurisdiction; so long 
as it is necessary to consider the federal ground in order to decide the case, . . . original 
jurisdiction exists." Hornstein, supra note 12, at 583. 
194. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965); see supra text accom­
panying notes 114-124. 
195. See supra notes 125-177 and accompanying text. Others have suggested less stringent 
tests for determining federal question jurisdiction. For example, Professor Paul Mishkin noted 
that the constitutional reach of federal courts' jurisdiction is broad enough to include almost 
any case with a federal ingredient, but Congress limited the statutory scope of that jurisdiction 
to avoid overloading the federal courts. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 160-63. He described 
this narrower scope as including only those cases that contain substantial claims based "di­
rectly" on federal law, colorable claims based on a substantive right to a remedy created by 
federal law. See id. at 165. He would not, however, limit jurisdiction to cases presenting valid 
federal claims or "actual" controversies because to do so would require deciding the case on 
the merits in order to determine jurisdiction. See id. at 166. 
Sinillarly, a student author proposed that federal question jurisdiction depend on whether 
the "plaintifrs complaint discloses actual, substantial reliance-at the time the judicial power 
is invoked-on a proposition of law that touches on federal primary relationships." Note, 
supra note 186, at 979. Under this test, the author explained, "the federal proposition must 
either prescribe the remedy sought or otherwise be a central question likely to be controverted 
at trial." Id. at 994 (footnote omitted). This standard aims to "prevent the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction on the basis of remote or purely speculative federal propositions, thereby preserv­
ing state courts' independence in adjudicating claims virtually certain not to depend on federal 
law." Id. at 995. While arguing that the existence or nonexistence of a federally created rem­
edy should not necessarily govern federal question jurisdiction, the author suggested that such 
a factor ought to create a presumption with regard to federal jurisdiction: if federal law pro­
vides the remedy, jurisdiction will be presumed; otherwise federal question jurisdiction will 
presumptively not exist, a presumption that the plaintiff can overcome by demonstrating a 
"reasonable likelihood that a federal proposition invoked by the plaintiff will prove decisive." 
Id. at 1005. Thus, both authors place great weight on requests for a federally created remedy. 
As applied to our paradigm case, this would lead back to "Pleader's Choice," see supra 
note 87, and the problems of artful pleading, see supra note 179, since a plaintiff could manipu­
late the jurisdictional question by formulating her prayer for relief either strictly in contract 
terms or in copyright terms, even though the substance ofeither remedy would be virtually the 
same (i.e., damages, injunctive relief, or both), differing only in its legal basis. Such methodol­
ogies elevate form over substance with no policy rationale for the distinction. 
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On balance, the best approach is that recommended by Professor 
William Cohen. He proposed that the courts take a pragmatic course to 
determining federal question jurisdiction: 
A novel claim of mixed federal and state law ought to qualify as "aris­
ing under" federal law only if it exhibits those features which justify 
the need for federal trial court jurisdiction of federal question cases. A 
case that requires expertise in the construction of the federal law in­
volved in the case, and a sympathetic forum for the trial of factual 
issues related to the existence of a claimed federal right, ought to fall 
within federal jurisdiction. On the other hand, a federal court should 
not be compelled to accept federal question jurisdiction over a class of 
suits which typically neither involves actual contested issues of federal 
law nor requires the protective jurisdiction of a sympathetic federal 
trial forum. 196 
Thus, Professor Cohen advised courts to consider a number of practical 
factors in the calculus of federal question jurisdiction, including, for ex­
ample, the likelihood that granting jurisdiction over a particular category 
of disputes will overburden the federal courts, the presence of a signifi­
cant federal interest in the suit, the need for federal expertise, and the 
need to avoid state bias. 197 While conceding the uncertainty in such an 
approach,198 Professor Cohen argued that the guidelines then in use cre­
ated comparable uncertainty. 199 Furthermore, he suggested, "A frank 
recognition of the pragmatic nature of the decision-making process 
would help throw light on the factors which actually induce decision. It 
would, moreover, reduce the danger that a judge would be beguiled by 
one of the numerous analytical tests into reaching an indefensible 
result."200 
Professor Cohen's approach has much to commend it: it is straight­
forward and avoids the hypertechnicality of the "outcome-determina­
tive" and hierarchical theories discussed above. Significantly, it 
196. Cohen, supra note 11, at 906. Professor William Cohen is not related to the author of 
this Article. This author approves his approach based on its merits, not on his surname. 
197. See id. 
198. Professor Cohen has been criticized by others making this same point. See. e.g., 
Note, supra note 186, at 980 ("A vague, intuitive 'federal interests' test is an escape, not an 
answer."). 
199. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 908. 
200. [d. at 907. Professor Chisum considered Cohen'S pragmatic approach in the context 
of patent jurisdiction and observed that the patent cases "show a conspicuous insensitivity to 
these kinds of pragmatic factors." Chisum, supra note 61, at 669. The risks presented by the 
exclusive nature of federal patent jurisdiction, he suggested, have made the courts particularly 
reluctant to adopt a more flexible approach that would deny the state courts all jurisdiction 
over such cases. Professor Chisum encouraged the courts to apply section 1331 pragmatically 
in some cases involving patent issues, thus allowing for original but not exclusive federal juris­
diction. [d. at 668-73. As discussed above, the courts will likely not adopt this different read­
ing of "arising under" for purposes of sections 1331 and 1338. See supra note 108. 
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encourages the courts to consider the policies underlying federal question 
jurisdiction in determining whether a particular case should be heard in a 
federal COurt.201 In line with this purpose, courts determining copyright 
jurisdiction should first return to the policies underlying federal copy­
right jurisdiction, as reflected in section 1338 and copyright law in 
general. 
B. 	 The National Interest in Copyright Matters Arguably Justifies Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Any Case Involving Copyrights 
It is well established that American copyright law serves two inter­
related purposes. The framers of the Constitution gave Congress the 
power to extend copyright protection to "Authors" of "Writings" in or­
der to "promote the Progress of Science and useful ArtS."202 An author 
receives copyright protection not only as a matter of private intellectual 
property entitlement, but also to encourage the creation of works in the 
interest of public enlightenment. As the courts have often recognized, 
copyright law attempts to strike an appropriate balance between provid­
ing authors with sufficient protection to foster the creation of works and 
ensuring public access to the works created. The control given to au­
thors is limited, both in time and in scope, so that others will have access 
to those works, whether simply for their own personal consumption or, 
more importantly, for use in creating their own original variations on 
such works.203 It is this broad, underlying policy that the federal courts 
must consider in deciding copyright disputes. 
Moreover, Congress's view that copyright law involves important 
national interests appears in two ways. First, Congress amended section 
301(a) of the Copyright Act in 1976 to provide for complete preemption 
of all state laws conferring rights equivalent to those protected by federal 
201. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (purposes of federal question jurisdiction). 
202. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8. 
203. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(Copyright "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors ... by the provision of a 
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation 
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and 
the other arts. • .. [T]he ultimate ainI is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for 
the general public good."); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.) 
("The copyright provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the corpus ofexisting 
knowledge by creating original works."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); see also 1 NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.03, at 1-31 to 1-34 (outlining judicial interpretations ofcopyright 
law's purposes). 
380 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 
copyright law.204 Thus, Congress clearly views copyright law as a matter 
of national, not state, concern. Second, Congress has long provided the 
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under the 
copyright law, reflecting a desire that such law be consistently inter­
preted by federal courts to promote national policy goals.205 
The typical copyright jurisdiction dispute, as outlined earlier, in­
volves conflicts between an author and a transferee based in part on a 
204. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, sec. 101, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572. 
This section now provides in pertinent part: 
[A]lliegal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 [of Title 17] in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the 
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 [of Title 17], ... 
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. . .. [N]o 
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State. 
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988). For more complete discussions of the scope and significance of the 
1976 Copyright Act's preemptive effect, see MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 11.5-11.10 (1989), and 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § J.Ol[B]. 
205. For a brief history of the federal courts' exclusive copyright jurisdiction, see supra 
note 62. The purpose of exclusive federal jurisdiction in this area, to ensure consistent, compe­
tent interpretation of copyright law, has long been recognized. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), for example, the Supreme Court noted that Congress's early 
passage of the first federal patent laws reflected its recognition of state patent protection's 
inadequacy, id. at 228, and further suggested, "The purpose of Congress to have national 
uniformity in patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) 
... ," id. at 231 n.7. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act also supports this view: 
"One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution ... was to 
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforc­
ing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts ofthe various states." 
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Decisions such as that of a Louisiana court in Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726 
(La. Ct. App. 1979), demonstrate the validity of concerns about state courts' interpretations of 
federal copyright law. The plaintiff in that case claimed that the defendant used his decals for 
shirt designs without his permission. The court observed: "At the time of these sales the 
decals allegedly copied by defendants bore a 'C' indicating plaintiff had an application pending 
for a copyright." Id. at 727. The court went on to vacate the trial court's injunction against 
defendant's use as without jurisdiction, holding "that the pending copyright application brings 
this within the exclusive federal jurisdiction." Id. at 728. This decision shows a basic misun­
derstanding of copyright law. An author does not "apply for" a copyright; the copyright 
simply exists once a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
302(a); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.01[A][I], at 9-4 to 9-4-1 (discussing 
when work is "created" for copyright purposes). Moreover, the designation "©," far from 
having anything to do with a copyright "application," is a notice placed on a work when it is 
publicly distributed to indicate that the owner claims copyright in that work. See 17 U.S.c. 
§ 401 (1988); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 7.02. Although this is just one example 
of the state courts' relative lack of expertise with copyright law, it is indicative of the larger 
problem. The paramount need for consistent and correct interpretation of the copyright laws 
demands that such matters be decided exclusively in the federal courts. 
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contract between those parties.206 Such a conflict implicates these impor­
tant federal copyright concerns in several ways. First, even if the dispute 
ultimately centers on the contract's terms, this contract involves a right 
that exists only by virtue of federal law. Moreover, copyright law ex­
pressly recognizes an author's right to transfer his or her copyright;207 
transfer may in fact be a necessary antecedent to the economic rewards of 
authorship, rewards that copyright law assumes are vital to promote the 
creation of such works. In addition to implicating these authorship in­
terests, such a dispute raises concerns of public access. How a court in­
terprets the contract will affect the rights of anyone who wants access to 
the work. In light of the significant federal stake in copyright matters, 
the federal courts could justify taking jurisdiction over any dispute in­
volving a copyright transfer because they could treat any such dispute as 
arising under the copyright laws. We must consider, therefore, why they 
have not exercised such a broad jurisdiction over copyright matters. 
C. The Limits on Federal Jurisdiction: Countervailing State Interests 
Although any dispute involving copyright matters implicates impor­
tant national interests, the federal courts have not concluded from this 
that they should take jurisdiction over all such cases. Furthermore, Con­
gress has made it clear that copyright law does not preempt state claims 
based on "legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright."208 As interpreted 
by the courts, breach of contract claims are not "equivalent" to any 
claim under the copyright laws and thus are not preempted thereby.209 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8. 
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1988) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred 
in whole or in part by any means ofconveyance or by operation oflaw, and may be bequeathed 
by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession."). 
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) ("Nothing in this title annuls or 
limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to ... 
activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright ...."). 
209. Courts and commentators agree that Congress did not intend to preempt claims for 
breach of contract, even if the contract involved a copyrighted work. See. e.g., Acorn Struc­
tures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding copyright law did not pre­
empt action alleging that use of copyrighted plans constituted breach of parties' contract); 
Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.) (ruling plaintiff's claim that defendant 
appropriated script idea in breach of contract not preempted by federal copyright law), affd 
mem., 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling plaintiff's quasi-contract claim in suit alleging that defendant appro­
priated her idea for a magazine article not preempted by federal copyright law); LEAFFER, 
supra note 204, § 11.7, at 333; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.01[B], at 1-15 to 1-17 
n.46. 
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Congress and the courts continue to distinguish claims based on state 
contract law from copyright claims, recognizing that contract matters 
present different concerns, concerns perhaps best left to the state courts. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Christianson continued a trend of 
limiting federal jurisdiction over patent matters.210 In line with that 
unanimous opinion, not every claim relating to the validity of patents 
arises under the patent laws, notwithstanding section 1338(a)'s grant of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent claims. Presumably, the Court 
would likewise limit copyright jurisdiction to cases in which "the plain­
tifrs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal [copyright] law, in that [copyright] law is a necessary 
element of one of the well-pleaded claims."211 
Thus, in spite of the arguments favoring the extension of federal ju­
risdiction to all cases that involve copyright matters, even pure breach of 
contract cases, such an approach is unlikely to appeal to either Congress 
or the courts. In the interest of pragmatism, some recommendation must 
be made to help the courts draw the line between federal and state juris­
diction in such cases. 
In formulating such a recommendation, we must first consider why 
Congress and the courts continually refuse to make copyright jurisdic­
tion all-inclusive. The federal interest in doing so is set forth above; the 
obvious countervailing interest involves the states' right to apply their 
own laws. Because copyright jurisdiction is exclusive, the state courts 
cannot take jurisdiction over any case found to arise under the copyright 
laws. Thus, before shutting the state courts out, we need to consider 
what important state interests might be at stake in our paradigm case and 
its variations. 
The states have an interest in maintaining consistent rules for the 
formation and interpretation of contracts. Persons transacting business 
and forming contractual relationships in a given state need to know what 
rules the state applies in determining the enforceability and meaning of 
contracts. They need to know how the state defines breach of contract 
and what remedies it will provide to a party that proves such a breach. 
Although these matters were of more local concern before the prolifera­
tion of interstate and international transactions, courts still generally 
treat such questions outside the copyright realm as matters of state and 
not federal law, even though parties now often do business across state or 
national boundaries. This view is consistent with the fundamental under­
210. See supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text. 
211. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). 
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standing of our federal system: the states have rights except when specif­
ically denied or limited by the Constitution.212 
Our Constitution's allocation of power between the state and federal 
governments, deferring to the states on matters of local concern, imposes 
significant political and philosophical constraints on the breadth of copy­
right jurisdiction. Thus, in deciding what cases "arise under the copy­
212. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. Although a full discussion of federalism is far beyond 
the scope of this Article, it is settled that great concerns over states' rights and the appropriate 
limitations on federal power have driven much of American history, as well as the framing of 
the Constitution. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 21-201 
(1987); How FEDERAL Is THE CoNSTITUTION? (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra 
eds., 1987). Many Supreme Court decisions reflect this deference to state law concerns. For 
example, in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), the Court held that 
decisions of the highest court ofa state were final on matters ofstate law and not reviewable by 
the Supreme Court: "The State courts are the appropriate tribunals ..• for the decision of 
questions arising under their loca1law, whether statutory or otherwise." ld. at 626. See gener­
ally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 10.2, 10.5 (1989) (examining 
Supreme Court review of state court judgments and proceedings); TRIBE, supra note 183, §§ 3­
22 to 3-24 (describing constitutional and policy limitations on federal review of state deci­
sions). The doctrine of abstention affords another example of federal deference to state auton­
omy and power over loca1law. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), 
the Court held that federal courts should abstain from deciding cases on federal constitutional 
grounds that they might resolve on the basis of state law, and that those issues of state law 
should be resolved by the state courts prior to any federal decision on federal grounds. ld. at 
500-01. The Court noted that "[f]ew public interests have a higher clainI upon the discretion 
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies." ld. at 500. 
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra § 12.2 (discussing when abstention is proper); TRIBE, 
supra note 183, §§ 3-28 to 3-30 (exploring abstention's policies of preserving integrity of state 
law and respecting autonomy of state judicial systems). Although these doctrines have many 
limitations and raise many interpretative problems, they clearly reflect the judiciary's respect 
for the historical and continuing American concern with state sovereignty and control over 
matters of state law. See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 479-749 (3d ed. 1988) (detailing interplay 
between federal authority and state jurisdiction). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the legitimacy ofstate law's con­
trol over matters of local concern, including issues of contract law. See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan 
Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68-69 (1966) (holding state law governed lease executed 
under federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357-58 
(1966) (finding state law concerns about capacity to contract overrode any federal interest in 
loan made by Small Business Administration); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956) (holding contlict between private parties regarding conver­
sion of federally guaranteed bonds to be based on state law because the existence of some 
federal interest was "far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of 
federal law to transactions essentially of local concern"); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 
109, 114 (1936) (finding no federal jurisdiction over a contract dispute: "The obligation of the 
contract being a creation of the state," there was "no necessary connection between the en­
forcement of such a contract according to its temIS and the existence of a controversy arising 
under federal law."). 
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right laws," courts should balance the state interest in local contract 
matters against the federal interest in copyright law. When the state in­
terest is more essential to the dispute, the court should treat the case as 
not arising under the copyright laws. 
On the other hand, when federal copyright interests are more press­
ing, the case should be heard in federal court. Given that federal copy­
right law fundamentally aspires to strike a balance between the public 
interest in access to works and the need to reward authors,213 courts de­
termining whether a case arises under the copyright laws should examine 
whether and to what extent the case implicates this policy concern. It is 
most important for federal courts to decide disputes that require weigh­
ing these concerns with public access and rewarding authors. Focusing 
on this principle allows us to specify the application of this balancing test 
and to construct, from the specific context of our paradigm case, a gen­
eral framework for deciding whether a case arises under the copyright 
laws. 
D. 	 Balancing State and Federal Interests: A Framework for Determining 
Copyright Jurisdiction 
In order to provide a more coherent and predictable method for de­
termining copyright jurisdiction, the following discussion proposes an 
analytical framework that focuses on three central issues: whether the 
author is the plaintiff; whether the plaintiffs claim presents distinct copy­
right issues that are independent from any contract issues in the case; 
and, when the author is plaintiff, whether her claims are likely to directly 
affect the parties' rights to use and to control use of the copyrighted 
work. The answers to these questions alone can and should determine 
copyright jurisdiction in most cases. Actions brought by copyright trans­
ferees, for example, should almost always be heard in state court.214 Ac­
tions brought by authors, however, require a deeper analysis, to which 
we now turn. 
(1) Claims for Copyright Infringement Brought by Authors Against Transferees 
a. 	 When the Transferee Has Used the Entire Work Without Change 
The "claim" most obviously created by the copyright statute is the 
claim for infringement of one of the copyright owner's exclusive 
213. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text. 
214. See infra Part III.D.3. Of course, this conclusion relates only to the existence of 
copyright jurisdiction, and assumes the absence of diversity of citizenship and other independ­
ent bases for federal jurisdiction. 
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rights.21S One might therefore assume that any time an author sues a 
transferee for copyright infringement, the federal courts should have ex­
clusive jurisdiction over the matter. The courts should, however, distin­
guish those cases in which the transferee has allegedly used the author's 
work in its entirely and in its original form from those in which the trans­
feree has allegedly used the author's work only in part or transformed it 
in some other way. A transferee may not take an author's work in its 
entirety, without changes, unless she obtains the right to do so through 
her contract with the author. In such a case, the outcome of the infringe­
ment question would follow automatically once the court determined 
whether the defendant breached the contract. The state law contract is­
sues predominate over federal copyright concerns in such cases, and the 
courts accordingly should treat them as not arising under the copyright 
laws.216 
The Ninth Circuit made this exact point in Topolos v. Caldewey217 to 
distinguish the case before it from Elan Associates v. Quackenbush Music, 
Ltd. 218 The plaintiff in Topolos claimed that the defendant had infringed 
the copyright in his book about Napa Valley wineries by publishing a 
different book on the same subject, whereas in Elan the plaintiff charged 
the defendant with using the very works in which it claimed exclusive 
rights. In finding that the Topolos case arose under the copyright laws, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
Only when such ownership [of copyright] is the sole question for con­
sideration are federal courts without jurisdiction. In Elan, although 
copyright infringement was alleged, the determination of infringement 
automatically followed upon decision of the ownership question. No 
independent determination of infringement had to be made. In this 
215. Title 17, section 501(a) of the United States Code provides in part that "[a]nyone who 
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 
118 ... is an infringer of the copyright ...." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. II 1990). Sections 502 
through 505 define the remedies available to a copyright owner who proves infringement. See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 (1988). 
216. Of course, exceptions to this rule would be proper when the dispute focuses on con­
tract terms that incorporate the language and standards of the copyright statute, thus arguably 
making the construction of federal copyright law a necessary element of the contract claim. 
For example, a contract provision that the transferee cannof"perform a work publicly" may 
require federal interpretation in order to strike the appropriate balance between what the 
transferee can and cannot do based on copyright law, as opposed to what it can do based on 
the terms of the contract. Similarly, cases that raise issues of whether a work is a "work for 
hire" either based on the contract or independent of its terms, such as Arthur Young & Co. v. 
City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1990), and Royal v. Leading Edge Products, 
833 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987), may require the federal courts' expertise with, and sensitivity to, 
copyright matters. 
217. 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 149-154. 
218. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 126-128. 
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case, however, after ownership of the copyright is decided the court 
must still resolve the issue whether two books published by [defendant] 
infringe any copyright in which Topolos has beneficial ownership. 
That question properly belongs to a federal court, since it requires an 
examination of the works, extent of the copying involved, and an appli­
cation of the Copyright Act.219 
Thus, when the transferee has copied or used the copyrighted work in its 
entirety, the claim is more accurately characterized as a contract law 
claim than as one created by the copyright laws. 220 
219. Topolos, 698 F.2d at 994 (footnote omitted); see also Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 
654 F. Supp. 133, 134-35 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding case not to arise under the copyright laws 
and distinguishing Topolos because the matter at hand required no examination of the works to 
determine infringement; rather, determination of infringement would follow automatically 
upon resolution of copyright ownership); Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 917 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining federal copyright jurisdiction when defendant republished plain­
tiff's book, because "once the contractual rights and duties of the parties are resolved, the 
Court so doing will not be called upon to make any determination about whether defendant's 
publication is an infringement"; rather, "infringement vel non would necessarily follow from 
the Court's finding on the contract issues"). 
The court in Deats v. Joseph Swantak, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), faced a 
similar issue in a patent case. The plaintiff in Deats, who had licensed a patent to the defend­
ant, claimed that the defendant breached the license agreement and then continued to use 
plaintiff's invention, resulting in "unjust enrichment." Id. at 975-76. The plaintiff sued in 
state court, but the defendant removed the action to federal court. The plaintiff then moved 
for remand, arguing that the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case, which included only breach of contract and other state law claims and therefore did not 
arise under the patent laws. Id. at 976. The court rejected plaintiff's characterization of the 
case, reasoning that it would first need to decide whether plaintiff's patent had been infringed 
in order to determine whether defendant was unjustly enriched by the continued use of plain­
tiff's invention. Id. at 981-82. Thus, relying on Franchise Tax Board, the court concluded that 
federal jurisdiction existed over the case because it "require[d] resolution of a substantial ques­
tion of federal law." Id. at 981 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 u.S. 1, 13 (1983». Because removal jurisdiction depended on the state court having 
proper jurisdiction over the original claim, however, see supra note 30, the court dismissed the 
patent claims instead of remanding them to the state court. See Deats, 619 F. Supp. at 982. As 
discussed above, the removal statute no longer requires such a result since Congress's 1986 
amendment. See supra note 30. 
220. A recent decision by Judge Robert Patterson of the Southern District of New York 
reflects another flawed approach to determining copyright jurisdiction. See Marshall v. New 
Kids on the Block Partnership, 780 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In that case, the plaintiff 
Marshall had photographed the defendant, New Kids on the Block (New Kids), a popular 
music recording group. Id. at 1006. Marshall, supported by an invoice, claimed that she 
retained the copyright in the photographs and had granted only limited reproduction rights to 
New Kids. Id. at 1006-07. Alleging that New Kids had exceeded such rights, Marshall filed a 
federal complaint framed in terms of copyright infringement against both New Kids and those 
who had reproduced the photographs with New Kids' consent. Id. at 1007-08. The defend­
ants introduced evidence of an oral contract that predated the invoice and entitled New Kids 
to use the photographs as alleged. Id. at 1007. The defendants then moved to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the case did not arise under the copyright laws. Id. 
at 1008. 
If the defendants had used the photographs in a way that exceeded the scope of the li­
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b. 	 When the Transferee Has Not Used the Work in Its Entirety or 
Has Transformed the Work 
If the transferee has only used a portion of the work, has added 
something to the work, or has changed it in some way, however, the 
federal concerns in the controversy predominate and a federal court must 
decide the case. In such cases, the court must decide whether the trans­
feree's work is "substantially similar" to the author's work, whether the 
transferee has taken copyrightable material, and whether the transferee's 
use can be considered a "fair use" of the author's work.221 These are 
critical questions that affect the nature and scope of copyright protection. 
Given Congress's clear and longstanding treatment of copyright policy 
matters as exclusively fed~ral, the courts must consider these federal in­
terests to be weightier than any state interest in such cases. These cases 
thus belong in federal court as actions arising under the copyright 
laws.222 
Moreover, cases in which an author sues a transferee and states an 
independent claim of copyright infringement as so described should fall 
cense, Judge Patterson reasoned, then they had made themselves "strangers" to the licensor 
and thus susceptible to suit for copyright infringement '~ust as if the claim were against any 
other infringer who is a stranger to the plaintiff." Id. at 1008-09. Judge Patterson believed 
that the answer to the jurisdictional question depended on the scope of the license; for pur­
poses of the motion to dismiss, he relied on the plaintiff's more restrictive version. See id. at 
1009. Under this view, defendants had exceeded the scope of the license and thereby became 
"strangers to the plaintiff" who could be sued for copyright infringement. See id. at 1010. 
Judge Patterson conceded, however, that his ruling did not "insulate the complaint from fur­
ther attack for lack of subject matter jurisdiction" if the defendants were able to prove that 
their use was within the scope of the license. Id. at 1010 n.3. 
The flaws in this approach are many. Judge Patterson decided the merits in order to 
decide jurisdiction, while conceding that those merits could not be decided without taking 
jurisdiction. Moreover, this case clearly raised important state contract law issues. For exam­
ple, would the parol evidence rule bar introduction of the oral contract? Could the oral con­
tract be used to interpret, ifnot to contradict, the written invoice? What rules of interpretation 
should apply to the written invoice? A court could not avoid deciding these significant ques­
tions of state contract law to determine the ultimate rights of the parties in the Marshall case. 
Thus, under the analysis proposed by this Article, the court should have dismissed this case as 
not arising under the copyright laws, assuming the defendants were reproducing the plaintiff's 
actual photographs. On the other hand, if the defendants were creating paintings based on the 
photographs, for example, rather than reproducing them unchanged, then the copyright issues 
would predominate and federal copyright jurisdiction would exist over the case. See infra 
notes 221-224 and accompanying text. 
221. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright." 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The copyright laws provide detailed guidance to courts 
determining whether a use is a fair use. See id. 
222. For a discussion of the importance of infringement decisions and how such decisions 
implicate copyright policy concerns, see, for example, Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the 
Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value 
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 184-230 (1990). 
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within federal jurisdiction regardless of whether the plaintiff frames the 
complaint solely in copyright terms or in conjunction with a contract 
claim. Congress's recent establishment of supplemental jurisdiction has 
indirectly overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Luckett v. Delpark. 
Inc. that pleading a state law claim constitutes a waiver of any federal 
patent claim, even if the plaintiff also pleads that federal claim.223 Sup­
plemental jurisdiction enables federal courts to decide state law claims 
that "are so related" to a claim within their original jurisdiction that 
"they form part of the same case or controversy."224 The federal courts 
223. 270 U.S. 496,511 (1926); see supra text accompanying notes 81-87. 
224. 28 U.S.c. § 1367(a) (Supp. II 1990). Congress enacted section 1367 as part of the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 31O(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113. In 
relevant part, it provides: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise 
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original juris­
diction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the 
joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. II 1990). This section aims to provide for more efficient handling 
of related claims and to avoid unnecessary fragmentation of cases. See H.R. REp. No. 734, 
WIst Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6873-76. For discus­
sions and criticisms of the new statute, see Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and 
Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY 
L.J. 445, 469-87 (1991), Thomas M. Mengler et aI., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invita­
tion to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213,214-16 (1991), David D. Siegel, 
Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improve­
ments Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 61-69 (1991), and Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The Congressional 
Resurrection of Supplemental Jurisdiction in the Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611, 
1651-64 (1991). 
Neither the text nor legislative history of section 1367 directly addresses whether supple­
mental jurisdiction is available in cases in which original federal jurisdiction is based on 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a)-for copyright, patent, plant-variety protection, and trademark claims-as 
opposed to the general federal question jurisdiction of section 1331. Long before it enacted 
section 1367, Congress had provided for original federal jurisdiction over "any civil action 
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under 
the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 1338(b), 62 Stat. 869, 931 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1988)). This 
provision only granted jurisdiction over unfair competition claims, however, and did not ex­
tend to breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 
Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1956) (construing section 1338(b)'s purpose in conferring 
federal jurisdiction over state unfair competition claims when joined with a substantial and 
related federal copyright, patent, or trademark claim as "to avoid 'piecemeal' litigation" (quot­
ing 28 U.S.c. § 1338 note (Supp. II 1948) (Legislative History-Reviser's Note))); accord 
Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Family Circle v. Family Circle Assocs., 332 F.2d 534, 536 (3d Cir. 1964). But see, e.g., Hazel 
Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d 399, 403-04 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding contract claim 
within federal jurisdiction as pendent to trademark claim). 
Despite section 1367's silence on the matter, an interpretation of supplemental jurisdic­
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should accordingly take jurisdiction over any and all claims that have a 
relation to a copyright claim sufficient to meet the standards of supple­
mental jurisdiction. Most cases in which an author sues a transferee for 
both breach of contract and copyright infringement would clearly meet 
this standard. 
(2) Claims for Breach of Contract Brought by Authors Against Transferees 
The jurisdictional issues differ when an author sues a transferee al­
leging only a breach of contract claim, presumably in state court. The 
transferee, in support of a motion to dismiss in state court or in defense 
of removal jurisdiction in federal court, may argue that copyright issues 
comprise necessary and substantial elements of the contract claim, urg­
ing that the case arises under the copyright laws and is within the exclu­
sive jurisdiction of the federal COurtS.22S The transferee might claim that 
the plaintiff is not the true author, for example, or that the work is not 
protected by a valid copyright. Although these arguments implicate is­
sues of copyright law, they really constitute defenses based on contract 
law, not elements of the contract law claim. itself.226 Arguments that the 
plaintiff does not own the copyright or that the work is not validly copy­
righted are mere defenses to the contract as based on fraud or mistake.227 
tion as governing cases involving claims that arise under the copyright laws would be consis­
tent with congressional intent. An early draft of section 1367 recommended that section 
1338{b) be eliminated as superfluous in light of the broader scope proposed for supplemental 
jurisdiction. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Re­
form Act: Hearing on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, Wist Cong., 
2d Sess. 700 (1990) (appendix to letter from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor, Western New England 
College School of Law, to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 8, 1990». Congress's failure to 
act upon this recommendation might signify an intention to continue section 1338{b)'s limita­
tion of federal supplemental jurisdiction over state claims related to federal copyright, patent, 
plant protection, and trademark claims to unfair competition claims. Given the broad reme­
dial purposes of section 1367, however, it seems more likely that Congress intended thereby to 
expand the supplemental jurisdiction already available for copyright, patent, plant protection, 
and trademark claims through section 1338{b). 
225. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Burnett v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures, 486 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. 
Div. 1985), affd mem., 492 N.E.2d 1231 (N.Y. 1986); Arch Music Co. v. Gladys Music, Inc., 
231 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758-59 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Schrut v. News Am. PUblishing, 474 N.Y.S.2d 903, 
904-05 (Civ. Ct. 1984). 
226. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1987) (fraud and con­
tract formation issues raised); Malinowski v. Playboy Enters., 706 F. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (contract formation issue); Elan Assocs. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461, 
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (fraud issue). 
227. See, e.g., 3 ARTHUR LINTON CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 600, at 607 (1960) 
("It may be found as a fact that the transaction was based upon the assumption that the patent 
was valid, and the price paid was the agreed exchange for the exclusive rights and privileges. 
390 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 
Copyright issues arise in these situations only as part of contract law 
defenses, not as part of the plainti1Ps contract law claim. In accordance 
with the well-pleaded complaint rule, issues raised by way of defense can­
not serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction. This rule reflects the 
courts' conclusion that the state law interests underlying the claims in 
such cases outweigh any federal interests in issues raised by way of 
defense.228 
On the other hand, the transferee might argue that the very sub­
stance of the contract dispute affects important federal copyright con­
cerns, thereby invoking the third prong of the test for federal copyright 
jurisdiction suggested by Judge Friendly.229 While a simple complaint 
for nonpayment of royalties does not require determination by the fed­
eral courts, some disputes over the meaning of contract language might 
raise sufficient federal copyright policy concerns to outweigh state law 
concerns, thereby justifying federal jurisdiction. Such disputes generally 
fall within one of three categories: Disputes regarding whether the agree­
ment transferred certain rights;230 disputes as to whether certain conduct 
constitutes a breach of contract;231 and disputes over the type of remedies 
allowable in the event of breach.232 
Then, if the patent is in fact void, there is a mistake as to a basic fact as to which the buyer or 
licensee meant to assume no risk ...."); see also Standard Button-Fastening Co. v. Ellis, 34 
N.E. 682, 683 (Mass. 1893) (dictum) (suggesting defendant licensees could refuse to pay royal­
ties if invalidity of patent prevented use of licensed invention); Herzog v. Heyman, 45 N.E. 
1127, 1128 (N.Y. 1897) (treating invalidity of patent as defense to suit for nonpayment of 
license fee); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS §§ 151-172 (1979) (mistake and 
misrepresentation). 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23. 
229. Cj. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823,828 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 
915 (1965), quoted supra text accompanying note 119. 
230. See, e.g., Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 
1982) (whether defendant's right to sell "mixed folios" of sheet music included right to sell 
"personality folios"); Daniel Wilson Prods. v. Time-Life Films, 736 F. Supp. 40, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (whether license covered home videocassette distribution rights); Franklin v. Cannon 
Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 133, 135 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (whether agreement entitled defendant to 
transfer rights to a third party). 
231. See, e.g., Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., 833 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (whether plain­
tiff was terminated for cause, thus permitting defendant to stop royalty payments); Powell v. 
Green Hill Publishers, 719 F. Supp. 743, 744 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (whether defendant's failure to 
register copyright of work was a material breach of its contract with plaintift); Franklin, 654 F. 
Supp. at 135 (whether defendant's transfer of certain rights to third party constituted a breach 
of its agreement with plain tift). 
232. See. e.g., Bear Creek Prods. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(whether plaintiff had right of reversion in copyright in the event of breach, where contract did 
not expressly so provide); Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 920 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32, 33 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); see also Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Disputes in the first category ordinarily implicate state law issues of 
contract interpretation above all else. These disputes typically focus on 
the intentions of the parties and the language used to express those inten­
tions; such matters are the traditional province of state contract law and 
hence should be determined by the state COurts.233 
Disputes focusing on whether given conduct constitutes a breach of 
contract, however, may involve questions that exceed the scope of mere 
state law concerns. The Second Circuit described a helpful method for 
making this distinction in the copyright context in Schoenberg v. Shapol­
sky Publishers, Inc. 234 In the second part of its three-step test, the court 
directed district courts to "determine whether the complaint alleges a 
breach of a condition to, or a covenant of, the contract licensing or as­
signing the copyright."235 If the breach alleged is of a contractual condi­
tion, not just of a covenant, then copyright jurisdiction exists. If the 
'plaintiff has alleged a breach of a covenant, however, "the court must 
undertake a third step and analyze whether the breach is so material as 
to create a right of recission in the grantor."236 If so, federal copyright 
jurisdiction exists.237 
Unfortunately, the Schoenberg court did not explain the rationale 
for this test.238 Schoenberg's focus on conditions as distinguished from 
covenants, however, is consistent with this Article's proposed approach 
to copyright jurisdiction. As defined by Professor Arthur Corbin, a 
"covenant," or "promise,"239 is an expression of an "intention that some 
future performance will be rendered."240 A promise "creates a legal duty 
in the promisor and a right in the promisee."241 A condition, on the 
1986) (whether plaintiff's right to revoke defendant's publishing rights in book as expressly 
provided for in contract had been triggered by defendant's conduct). 
233. When the parties express their intentions by reference to the standards and terms of 
art of the copyright statute, however, copyright jurisdiction is appropriate to the extent that 
the dispute turns on the meaning of those provisions. See supra note 216. 
234. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
235. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932. 
236. ld. 
237. ld. 
238. The Schoenberg court relied heavily on an earlier decision, Costello Publishing Co. v. 
Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in formulating its test. See Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 
932. Interestingly, however, Rotelle involved not a question of copyright jurisdiction, but 
rather a determination of indispensable parties. It was only in the context of that issue that the 
Rotelle court defined the diiference between a contract claim and a copyright infringement 
claim. See Rotelle, 670 F.2d at 1045. 
239. ''The word 'covenant' has come to be not much more than a synonym of 'promise.' .. 
3A CORBIN, supra note 227, § 633, at 29. 
240. ld. at 25. 
241. ld. 
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other hand, is a fact or event that operates to limit or modify a right or 
duty to perform. "The non-occurrence of a condition will prevent the 
existence of a duty in the other party; but it may not create any remedial 
rights and duties at all, and it will not unless someone has promised that 
it shall occur."242 
In order to determine whether a given term is a covenant or a condi­
tion, Corbin suggested that courts perform the following analysis: 
The first step, therefore, in interpreting an expression in a con­
tract, with respect to condition as opposed to promise, is to ask oneself 
the question: Was this expression intended to be an assurance by one 
party to the other that some performance by the first would be ren­
dered in the future and that the other could rely upon it? If the answer 
if yes, we have found the expression to be a promise that the specified 
performance will take place. The alternative question to be asked is: 
Was this expression intended to make the duty of one party condi­
tional and dependent upon some performance by the other (or on some 
other fact or event)? If the answer to this question is yes, we have 
found that the specified performance is a condition of duty, but we 
have not found that anyone has promised that the performance will 
take place. It is not difficult to draw the logical distinction between a 
promise that a specified performance will be rendered, and a provision 
that makes a specified performance a condition of the legal duty of a 
party who promises to render another performance. The first creates a 
legal duty in the promisor; the second limits and postpones a prom­
isor's duty. Often the contracting parties do not make this logical dis­
tinction and therefore so word their agreements as to make 
interpretation difficult. When such is the case, the court is free to give 
the contract the "construction" that appears to be the most reasonable 
and just.243 
This distinction proves instructive for determinations ofjurisdiction 
in the context of a copyright contract. For example, suppose that a copy­
right assignment provides, "The transferee agrees to promote sales of the 
work." If the transferee fails to promote the work, the author may sue 
for breach of this term. The court would then have to decide whether the 
promotion clause was a condition to the author's duty to perform, i.e., to 
assign the copyright to the transferee, or was simply a covenant. 
The court would make this determination based on what it found to 
be the intention of the parties, ascertained from the language of the con­
tract and other relevant evidence.244 If the court concluded that the au­
242. [d. at 26. Note also that fulfillment of a promise by one party can be a condition of 
the other party's duty to perform, and that a party can promise to fulfill the terms required by 
a condition. [d. 
243. [d. at 32. 
244. "Whether a provision in a contract is a condition the nonfulfillment of which excuses 
performance depends upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair and reason­
393 January 1993] COPYRIGHT JURISDICTION 
thor only agreed. to transfer the copyright if the transferee promoted the 
work, it would construe the clause as a condition and excuse the author 
from any obligation to transfer the copyright. According to the Schoen­
berg test, this case would arise under the copyright laws.24s This result 
seems correct because the ultimate decision in the case will obviously 
have a significant effect on the author's and the transferee's rights to use 
and to control use of the work. 
On the other hand, if the court found that the promotion clause was 
only a covenant and not a condition to the author's duty to transfer the 
copyright, then the author could sue for breach of that covenant and 
recover damages. Only if the transferee's breach is considered to be "ma­
terial" or "total" would the author also be excused from her promise to 
transfer the copyright.246 Thus, unless the breach was material, the court 
would uphold the author's obligation to transfer the copyright and leave 
the transferee's access to the work undisturbed. In such a case, copyright 
jurisdiction is unnecessary. 
This leads us to the third step of the Schoenberg test, determining 
whether the breach of the covenant was a material breach. This in turn 
requires a court to consider what constitutes "substantial perform­
ance."247 Part of that determination is again a question of interpreting 
intent and contract language. The analysis, however, must also incorpo­
rate evaluations of the contract's true significance and the elements of 
performance that are required to avoid committing a material breach.248 
Such determinations in the context of a copyright transfer may in turn 
require a heightened appreciation of the full value of a copyright and the 
rights attached thereto. In confronting whether a dispute over breach of 
contract raises substantial issues of copyright policy, the courts should 
therefore focus on the author's allegations of breach to ascertain whether 
able construction of the language used in light of all the surrounding circumstances when they 
executed the contract." 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs 
§ 663, at 127 (3d ed. 1961) (quoting Lach v. Cahill, 85 A.2d 481, 482 (Conn. 1951»; accord 
Durapin, Inc. v. American Prods., 559 A.2d 1051, 1056 (R.I. 1989); Jones Assocs. v. Eastside 
Properties, Inc., 704 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
245. Cj. supra text accompanying note 235 (quoting second part of the Schoenberg test). 
246. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 237 (1979) ("[1]t is a condition of 
each party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of 
promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any such 
performance due at an earlier time."). 
247. For a discussion of substantial performance, see 3A CoRBIN, supra note 227, §§ 700­
712. For a discussion of "material" or "total" breach, see 4 id. § 946. 
248. See 3A id. §§ 704-707; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 241 
(1979), quoted infra note 249. 
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the dispute impinges upon those policy concerns to such an extent as to 
outweigh the stake of state contract law in the case. 
For example, reconsider the hypothetical contract with the promo­
tion clause. If the court deduced from the language used and surround­
ing circumstances that this term was merely a promise by the transferee 
and not a condition to the author's obligation to transfer the copyright, 
the author would then argue that the transferee's breach of this promise 
constituted a material breach. In determining whether this breach was 
"material," the court might consider, among other things, the promotion 
term's relative value as part of the consideration for the author's promise 
to transfer the copyright. If the author's compensation was to be based 
entirely or substantially on sales of the work by the transferee, for exam­
ple, then the failure to promote would be more significant than it would 
if the author received payment largely on some other basis, such as a 
lump sum.249 This determination has a strong relation to copyright pol­
icy, because it links the jurisdictional inquiry to whether the outcome of 
the case will substantially affect the economic incentives that copyright 
law bestows upon authors. 
Finally, disputes over remedies are the most likely to draw in impor­
tant copyright concerns. When the author claims a right of reversion in 
the copyright as a consequence of the transferee's breach of the license 
agreement, for example, the court must do more than simply interpret 
the contract. Because the court has to determine whether the breaching 
licensee should lose her right to use the copyrighted work as a result of 
249. Compare, e.g., Frankel v. Stein & Day, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(ruling authors entitled to recission of publishing agreement when publisher failed to pay au­
thors two-thirds of $27,500 "signature payment," because evidence indicated parties would 
regard such breach as "material"), affd mem., 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980) with Nolan v. Sam 
Fox Publishing Co., 499 F.2d 1394, 1398-99 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding failure to pay 74% of 
royalties due author under copyright assignment did not constitute material breach). The Re­
statement (Second) of Contracts provides guidance: 
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, 
the following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; 
(b) 	the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part 
of that benefit of which he will be deprived; 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer 
forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his 
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979). 
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the breach, the court's decision will have a direct impact on the balance 
struck by copyright law between protecting the interest of others in ac­
cess to a work and rewarding the author. A state court, being less sensi­
tive to copyright policy, might analyze these disputes over remedies as 
matters of literal contract interpretation even though the copyright inter­
ests involved demand otherwise. Because disputes involving a claimed 
right of reversion raise federal copyright concerns that outweigh state 
law concerns, they should be heard in federal court. 
These determinations-whether a breach is of a condition or of a 
covenant, whether a breach is material, and whether reversion should be 
ordered as a remedy-obviously cannot be made on the basis of the 
pleadings alone. A proper jurisdictional inquiry in such cases seems to 
require the court to delve into the merits in order to evaluate the stake of 
copyright policies in the matter. In the interests of both judicial econ­
omy and federal copyright policy, it would be best to treat suits by au­
thors against transferees that will require such analysis of the merits to 
resolve jurisdiction as presumptively arising under the copyright laws in 
cases of doubt, erring on the side of being overinclusive rather than un­
derinclusive in defining federal copyright jurisdiction.2so Thus, when a 
substantive analysis of an author's claim for breach of contract reveals 
that the case will likely involve issues of conditional duty, material 
breach, or reversion of the copyright, the courts should find copyright 
jurisdiction to exist. 
(3) Claims by Transferees Against Authors or Other Transferees 
A different analysis applies when a transferee sues an author, claim­
ing that the author transferred the copyright and then infringed the 
copyright and breached the transfer agreement by using the work with­
250. One might ask why federal policy should outweigh state policy in cases of conflict. 
Althoughjurisdictional friction might be resolved differently in theory, both the general struc­
ture of our federal system, see U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); Gade 
v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-88 (1992) (holding federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts state laws that tend to conflict or interfere with 
its provisions, even if those state laws were intended to serve different, legitimate state pur­
poses), and the specific provisions offederal copyright law, see supra notes 204-205 and accom­
panying text, have resolved such conflicts in favor of federal law. See also Arthur Young & 
Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967,970 (4th Cir. 1990) (" '[W]here the jurisdictional facts 
are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute ... the entire factual dispute 
is appropriately resolved only by a proceeding on the merits.' " (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 
F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)) (omission by court)). 
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out the transferee's permission.251 At first glance this situation resembles 
that of the author's claim against the transferee described above. In the 
transferee's case, however, the entire claim rests primarily on the terms 
of the parties' agreement. The transferee has no right to use or to control 
the use of the work and cannot claim copyright infringement unless the 
agreement effected a transfer of title to the copyright. The success or 
failure of the transferee's lawsuit will ultimately depend on whether the 
contract is valid and prohibits the author's alleged conduct. Since a con­
tract claim thus lies at the heart of such cases, the federal courts should 
decline copyright jurisdiction.252 
If the transferee brings only a contract claim, presumably in state 
court, the author might remove the case to federal court. In this situa­
tion, however, copyright issues will arise only in defenses to the contract 
claim, if at all. That is, the transferee charges the author with breaching 
the contract by continuing to use the copyrighted work after transferring 
the copyright. The author could only defend with arguments regarding 
the scope of the agreement and what works and rights it incorporates. 
That the author created the work and formerly owned the copyright does 
not alter the nature of the transferee's claim. Such a case brought by a 
transferee against an author solely on a contract law theory belongs in 
state court. Because these cases do not arise under the copyright laws, 
federal courts must refuse to take removal jurisdiction, remanding them 
to state court.253 
Finally, when the dispute arises between putative transferees and the 
author is not even a party, there is even less reason to exercise copyright 
jurisdiction. Although disputes among transferees clearly affect public 
access to a work, the need to reward the author plays no significant role 
in such cases. The interests at stake bear only a distant relation to copy­
right's balance of the author's rights against the public's interest in ac­
251. See, e.g., Elan Assocs. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461, 461-62 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
252. Because the federal court will not be able to resolve the copyright issue without also 
deciding the contract claim, any federal case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and 
the transferee should file in state court for a determination of the state claim. If the state court 
finds that the transferee holds the copyright in the works by virtue of the contract, then it 
might need to consider whether the author's particular conduct constitutes infringement of 
that copyright-for example, whether the author has used a substantially similar work. That 
question, as discussed above, implicates important copyright issues and should thus be consid­
ered separately in federal court, but only after state court adjudication of the contract claim. 
While this two-step process may seem inefficient at first glance, in reality many disputes would 
be completely resolved at the state court level, thus easing the burden on the litigants and the 
federal court system. 
253. Again, this conclusion assumes the absence of diversity of citizenship and other in­
dependent bases for removal jurisdiction. 
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cess. Moreover, such claims are likely to turn primarily on issues of 
contract interpretation, not copyright issues. Thus, for example, the 
courts should treat cases like Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Ojfice254 and 
Peay v. Morton,255 in which the disputes arise between assignees alone 
over the use of unaltered, copyrighted works, rendering examination of 
the works unnecessary, as not arising under the copyright laws, regard­
less of how the plaintiffs frame their complaints.256 
Conclusion 
The courts and commentators have not carefully analyzed the 
framework of federal copyright jurisdiction. The courts have followed 
two essentially different courses in determining whether a claim "arises 
under" the copyright laws. One method focuses only on the face of the 
complaint, deferring to the pleader's choice in drafting the claim in terms 
of copyright or contract law. That approach, while superficially consis­
tent with the well-pleaded complaint rule, suffers from excessive toler­
ance for artful pleading and conflicts with recent Supreme Court 
opinions endorsing a deeper analysis of the true nature of the claims 
presented. The second method, which encourages the courts to look be­
yond the complaint's face to determine the true nature of claims, is pref­
erable, but the courts have thus far applied it without careful 
consideration of copyright policy and the purposes of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the copyright laws. 
In order to make jurisdictional decisions rationally consistent with 
these policy goals, courts should determine whether a given case arises 
under the copyright laws by weighing state law concerns with respect to 
contract law against federal concerns with copyright law. The courts 
should focus on a number of factors in applying this balancing test. 
First, if the case includes an author's claim for infringement that is truly 
independent of and separable from any contract claim because it involves 
a use of the copyrighted work in other than its original form, then the 
federal courts should take jurisdiction over the matter in order to deter­
mine whether the works are substantially similar, whether copyrightable 
material has been taken, and whether the use complained of was a "fair 
use." Moreover, in such cases the federal courts should exercise their 
254. 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. 
255. 571 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); see supra note 154. 
256. When a transferee's suit does present such copyright issues as substantial similarity or 
fair use, copyright jurisdiction should attach only after a state court has resolved the primary 
contract dispute. See supra note 252. 
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supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate any contract claim as well as the 
copyright claim. 
Federal courts should also exercise copyright jurisdiction over suits 
against transferees by authors claiming breach of a contractual condition 
or material breach, or seeking reversion of the copyright as a remedy for 
breach. Because resolving these issues requires inquiry into the merits 
and evaluation of the copyright policies at stake in the matter, it is more 
efficient and responsible to permit federal copyright jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, copyright jurisdiction should not exist over cases 
brought by authors charging transferees with verbatim copying of the 
entire work at issue. Such conduct by transferees would automatically 
infringe the copyright if not done within the scope of a license or assign­
ment agreement. As pure contract cases, these matters belong in state 
court. 
Finally, the courts should treat cases brought by transferees against 
authors as not arising under the copyright laws because any copyright 
infringement claim in such cases wholly derives from and hinges upon 
the contract between the author and the transferee. The contract claim is 
thus the heart of such claims. For the same reason, federal courts should 
not take jurisdiction over disputes between transferees to which the au­
thor is not a party. To the extent that pure copyright issues do arise in 
suits by transferees against authors or other transferees, a federal court 
may address them only after a state court has adjudicated the contract 
issues in the case. 
Although the approach proposed here lacks the clarity of the face of 
the complaint test, it provides litigants and the courts with practical 
guidelines, grounded in coherent policy justifications, for use in deter­
mining copyright jurisdiction. 
